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Common ownership describes the situation in which equities of multiple companies
are held by the same (institutional) investors. Table 1 demonstrates an example of
common ownership of suppliers and customers (i.e., vertical common ownership).
Tenneco, a designer and manufacturer of emissions and ride-control products, is
selling to multiple automotive companies all over the world. Its customers include
U.S. companies such as Caterpillar, Ford Motor, Navistar, Harley Davidson, etc.
Table 1 reports the top 10 institutional investors for Tenneco and its four major
U.S. customers as of 2010 Q4. Among these institutional investors, Fidelity, Van-
guard, and BlackRock hold equities in all five companies; Wellington and State
Street hold four out of the five companies. In sum, Tenneco and its major cus-
tomers all have a similar structure of top institutional investors. It is interesting
to assess the impact of common owners on the firms in their holding portfolios.
To the extent that common owners may aim to maximize portfolio value instead
of a single firm’s value, they could attempt to maximize portfolio value by miti-
gating the conflicts between the firms in the portfolios. A growing literature has
examined the anti-competitive effects of common holdings of competitors (e.g., He
and Huang, 2017; Azar et al., 2018). The potential anti-competitive effects have
also led to debates among legal scholars and economists concerning anti-trust reg-
ulations for institutional investors (e.g., Elhauge, 2015; Bebchuk and Hirst, 2019).
Nevertheless, the relationships between the firms in common owners’ portfolios are
quite complex, including not only competitors but also collaborators. Studies of
common owners’ influence on other relationships in their portfolios, for example,
suppliers and customers, can lead to a new perspective for more comprehensive
examinations of common ownership, and may adjust scholars’ and regulators’ neg-
ative opinions about common ownership. However, very few studies have assessed
the effects of common ownership of suppliers and customers. Moreover, the exist-
ing literature has largely overlooked an important impact of common ownerships:
their effects on corporate investment decisions. In this paper, I focus on the impact
of supplier-customer common holdings on a special type of corporate investment
— technological innovation, which is critical for a firm’s long-term competitive
advantage and sustainable growth (Porter, 1992).
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Table 1. This table reports the top 10 institutional investors for Tenneco and
its four major U.S. customers as of 2010 Q4. Tenneco is a designer and
manufacturer of emissions and ride-control products. Its major U.S. customers
include Caterpillar, Ford Motor, Navistar, and Harley Davidson. Among the
institutional investors, Fidelity, Vanguard, and BlackRock are holding all five
companies; Wellington and State Street are holding four out of the five
companies.
Tenneco Caterpillar
Institution Holding% Institution Holding%
Fidelity 13.70% State Street 12.02%
Vanguard 4.97% Vanguard 4.03%
Blackrock 4.92% Blackrock 3.82%
Wellington 4.23% Fidelity 3.28%
Westfield Capital 3.39% State Farm 3.13%
Columbia Management 3.05% Capital World 1.86%
Next Centutry 2.85% Mellon Bank 1.59%
Gamco 2.80% Bill&Melinda Gates 1.52%
Iridian 2.51% Northern Trust 1.31%
State Street 2.24% Primecap 1.30%
Navistar Harley Davidson
Institution Holding% Institution Holding%
Fidelity 12.52% David Selected 10.58%
Owl Creek 8.01% Capital Research 7.63%
Wellington 6.67% Vanguard 4.98%
Blackrock 4.41% Wellington 4.64%
Gamco 4.29% Fidelity 4.50%
Vanguard 4.21% Blackrock 4.00%
Oppenheimer 3.33% T Row Price 3.56%
Deutsche Bank 2.36% State Street 3.54%
Frontier Capital 2.26% Independent Franchise 1.53%














Although common ownership may in principle affect the innovation activities
of both suppliers and customers, I focus in this paper on the activities of suppliers
because suppliers are generally more innovation active than customers reported
in commonly available databases. In contrast, a lot of customers, such as firms
in the retail industry, are generally dormant in innovation.1 Furthermore, it is
important to study suppliers’ innovation activities because upstream innovation
is crucial along the supply chain. It has a strong impact on downstream firms and
acts as a double-edged sword. On one hand, it can devalue customers’ assets-in-
place through vertical creative destruction (Gofman et al., 2020), but on the other
hand, collaboration with innovative suppliers is an important way to improve
customers’ own innovation performance (Huston and Sakkab, 2006; Henke and
Zhang, 2010).
Common ownership of suppliers and customers could affect suppliers’ inno-
vations through a number of plausible channels. The first one is the hold-up
mitigation channel. Customized innovations by suppliers lead to products for
specific customers. These relationship-specific projects are not easily marketed
or used elsewhere. Therefore, concerns over possible opportunism and hold-up
behavior of the customer will lead to underinvestment in (relationship-specific)
innovation by the supplier (Klein et al., 1978). Some seminal theoretical studies
(e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990) suggest that joint asset
ownership attenuates hold-up problems under conditions of asset specificity and
ex-ante incomplete contracting. As one type of joint asset ownership, common
owners could actually benefit from improved supplier innovation performance re-
sulting from better supplier-customer relationship, because the positive spillovers
of supplier innovations towards customers help increase the value of the entire port-
folio. Therefore, common owners could be motivated to lower the likelihood for
hold-up problems to occur, thereby improving suppliers’ innovation performance,
especially their investment in (relationship-specific) innovation activities.
The second plausible channel through which vertical common ownership may
1In untabulated results, I also test the impact of common ownership on innovation-active
customers. The sample size of innovation-active customers is much smaller than that for suppliers
because the dataset I use, Compustat Customer Segment, reports only the major customers (the
sales value to the customer constitutes at leat 10% of its supplier’s total sales) for each supplier.
And I find no statistically significant results.
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affect supplier innovation is the technological spillover channel. Manso (2011)’s
principal-agent model proposes that timely feedback from the principal to the
agent enhances the agent’s innovation. Consistently, Chu et al. (2019) provide
empirical evidence that timely feedback from customers to suppliers is one of the
potential channels that improve suppliers’ innovation performance. Past empiri-
cal studies imply that common ownership facilitates information exchange about
technological innovation between the held firms. In particular, common owner-
ships increase the cross-citations between the patents assigned to different firms in
the same portfolio (Freeman, 2021; Kostovetsky and Manconi, 2020). By increas-
ing information exchange between suppliers and customers, common ownership
could lead to more technological spillovers between customers and suppliers, and
consequently improved innovation performance by suppliers.
The third channel is a vertical creative destruction channel. Vertical creative
destruction describes the situation that innovations by suppliers can devalue cus-
tomers’ assets-in-place (Gofman et al., 2020). Common owners tend to internalize
all the externalities imposed to firms held in the same portfolio (Hansen and Lott,
1996), so they might also react to the negative impact due to vertical creative
destruction by weakening suppliers’ innovation activities.
Using the Compustat customer segment dataset, I match each supplier to its
principal customers from 1980 to 2010.2 I examine the impact of institutional
common holdings of both suppliers and customers on the suppliers’ innovation ac-
tivities along three dimensions: inputs to innovation (measured by R&D intensity),
quantity of innovation ouput (measured by the number of patent applications), and
quality of innovation output (measured by the average market value of patents).
The baseline regression analyses show that suppliers’ innovation input, quantity
and quality of innovation output all increase significantly when institutional com-
mon owners are holding higher fractions of the equity issued by suppliers and their
principal customers. This result is robust to alternative common ownership mea-
sures based on different assumptions about institutional investors’ attention. The
effect of vertical common ownership on innovation activities is different from that
of horizontal common ownership. In particular, vertical common ownership has
2The innovation variables are constructed based on Kogan et al. (2017)’s innovation dataset,
which stops at 2010.
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stronger and more robust impact on innovation input and quality of innovation
output.
Nevertheless, institutions do not randomly invest in firms. A potential en-
dogeneity concern is that institutions could choose to invest in firms with good
innovation prospects. In addition, other omitted variables, such as managerial
traits, could drive both common ownership and supplier innovation. To mitigate
those potential endogeneity concerns, I exploit a quasi-natural experiment based
on financial institution mergers and acquisitions (M&As) with both difference-
in-differences (DiD) and instrument variable (IV) approaches following He and
Huang (2017) and Azar et al. (2018). M&As of financial institutions lead acquir-
ers to hold more firms in their portfolios. As a result, potentially more suppliers
and customers will be commonly held by the acquirers. M&As of financial institu-
tions thus cause mechanical increments of vertical common ownership. Meanwhile,
M&As of financial institutions are not likely to be driven mainly by an intent to
affect corporate innovation. Therefore, such M&As can be used as a plausibly
exogenous reason for changes of common ownership. The DiD analysis shows that
the treated firms, relative to control firms, experience about 2% higher increase in
R&D intensity, 9% higher increase in patent applications, and 9% higher increase
in average patent value after the financial institution mergers. The analysis using
the instrumental variable approach leads to a similar result.
All these findings suggest that there exist positive, and plausibly causal, effects
of supplier vertical common ownership on supplier innovation activities. Next, I
examine potential channels through which vertical common ownership could affect
supplier’s innovations. First, I test the hold-up channel. If common ownership
actually affects suppliers’ innovation activities by mitigating the hold-up issues,
I expect to find that the impact is less pronounced for firms with fewer hold-
up problems in the first place. I construct three proxies for hold-up issues: (1)
the supplier’s vertical integration with its operating segments, (2) the supplier’s
bargaining power relative to its customers, and (3) the asset specificity of the
supplier’s input to customers. Consistent with the prediction, I find that the
impact of common ownership on innovation activities is weaker for suppliers that
(1) are more vertically integrated, (2) have stronger bargaining power relative to
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their customers, and (3) supply to customers using assets that are more easily
redeployed.
Second, I test the technological spillover channel. If technological spillover is
the underlying force for common ownership to improve supplier innovation activ-
ities, I expect that the impact is stronger for suppliers with higher technology
proximity to their customers. I find results consistent with this prediction.
Third, I test the vertical creative destruction channel. The vertical creative
destruction effect should be the strongest if the suppliers are capital-goods produc-
ers. Consistently, I find that vertical common ownership can potentially weaken
innovation output for suppliers in capital-producing industries and the positive
association between vertical common ownership and innovation output exists only
for intermediate-goods producers.
Interestingly, I find that common ownership mainly influences innovation in-
put (i.e. investment in innovation) through the hold-up mitigation channel, and
affects innovation output (both quantity and quality) through the technological
spillover and vertical creative destruction channels. The findings suggest that
these three channels work on different aspects of innovation activities. Mitigation
of hold-up issues increases the incentive to invest, but does not necessarily in-
crease innovation efficiency. In contrast, improved technological spillovers as well
as vertical creative destruction work mainly on increasing innovation efficiency,
but have little influence on investment in innovation.
In addition, I also test the relation between common ownership and patent
cross-citations at supplier-customer level. I find that common ownership at the
firm-pair level mainly increases the citations from suppliers to their customers.
This finding is potentially consistent with both channels. On one hand, citations
from suppliers towards customers could imply technological information spreading
from customers to suppliers, which suggests that common ownership improves
technological spillovers between suppliers and customers. On the other hand,
it could imply suppliers’ customized innovation towards customers, suggesting
common ownership improves relationship-specific innovation. Furthermore, I find
that the citations from suppliers to their customers are more likely to be a proxy
for relationship-specific innovation, because common ownership has a significantly
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weaker impact on citations when the intensity of hold-up issues is lower. This
finding provides additional evidence that common ownership could mitigate hold-
up issues, thereby leading to more relationship-specific innovation.
This study contributes to four strands of the literature. First, this study
contributes to the emerging literature on common ownership. The literature on
common ownership focuses mainly on its anti-competitive effects on corporate
policies and product markets (e.g., Antón et al., 2018; Azar et al., 2018), but ig-
nores its potential positive effects. Freeman (2021) shows that common ownership
can improve cooperation between suppliers and customers, and my paper provides
evidence for a bright side of common ownership through its impact on supplier
innovation.
Second, this study contributes to the literature on hold-up problems. While
theoretical analysis on this topic is extensive (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Hart and Moore, 1990), empirical evidence is scarce, and focuses mainly on vertical
integration as one potential solution to mitigate hold-up problems (e.g., Lafontaine
and Slade, 2007). In the absence of vertical integration, partial equity holdings can
also improve relationships along the supply chain. For example, Fee et al. (2006)
show that when the customer owns an equity stake in its supplier, the relationship
lasts longer. This study investigates an alternative method to mitigate hold-up
problems based on integration through a third party, i.e., institutional investors.
Third, this study contributes to the literature on the impacts of supply-chain
relationships on corporate decisions. The past literature has assessed how supplier-
customer relationships affect corporate financing decisions, such as capital struc-
ture (Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Banerjee et al., 2008; Chu, 2012) and the cost of
debt (Cen et al., 2016a). Chu et al. (2019) show the geographic proximity between
a customer and its suppliers can enhance firm innovation. This study examines
how improved supplier-customer relationships, on the basis of vertical common
ownership, could influence corporate innovation activities.
Lastly, this study contributes to the literature on corporate innovation by find-
ing another potential determinant for corporate innovation. One of the drivers of
corporate innovation is variation in ownership structure, such as the formation of
strategic alliances (Chemmanur et al., 2016) and hedge fund activism (Brav et al.,
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2018). This paper examines a more general form of ownership structure (institu-
tional common ownership of suppliers and customers) that takes into account all
types of institutions.
A significant body of academic work has expressed serious concern about the
potential anti-competitive effects of common ownership. Some legal scholars pro-
pose strong anti-trust measures on institutional investors, such as limiting invest-
ment managers’ holdings in each economic sector, and having regulators scrutinize
the behavior of common owners (e.g., Posner et al., 2017; Scott Morton and Hov-
enkamp, 2017). The findings of this paper shed a light upon the brighter side of
common ownership. Regulators may motivate institutional investors to hold firms
in different sectors along the supply chain, thereby mitigating the anti-competitive
effects, and obtaining extra benefit by improving collaboration between upstream
and downstream firms.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the an-
tecedent literature. Section 3 describes sample construction and reports summary
statistics. Section 4 presents the analyses and results covering the relationship
between common ownership and suppliers’ innovations, including baseline regres-
sions, identification, and additional tests. Section 5 presents the analyses and the
results of the potential channels through which vertical common ownership could
influence suppliers’ innovations. Section 6 concludes.
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
DEVELOPMENT
Related Literature
Common Ownership One basic assumption in financial economics is that the
ultimate goal of firm management is to maximize shareholders’ value. When
shareholders are holding multiple firms in their portfolios, value optimization is
no longer focused on a single firm, but the entire portfolio. The past literature
has suggested that shareholder diversification can induce managers to internalize
all types of externalities (including technological innovation, legal litigation, etc.)
imposed on commonly owned firms (e.g., Hansen and Lott, 1996; Gordon, 2003).
However, there are concerns about the mechanisms whereby common owners
coordinate the firms in portfolio, especially when the shareholder is a passive in-
vestment fund that holds massive numbers of firms in its portfolio. The emerging
empirical literature has provided support for multiple potential channels, includ-
ing voice, vote, and incentives. Azar et al. (2018) discuss anecdotal evidence
for a voice channel, including engagement meetings between “passive” funds and
portfolio firm managers. He et al. (2019) show that common owners (including
both passive and active funds) are more likely to vote against management on
shareholder-sponsored governance proposals. Regarding incentives, Antón et al.
(2018) show that common owners have rendered the compensation of top managers
less sensitive to firm performance.
Based on the plausible mechanisms discussed above, past studies have docu-
mented the impacts of common ownership on various aspects of corporate policies,
such as mergers and acquisitions (Matvos and Ostrovsky, 2008), product market
competition (Azar et al., 2018; Azar et al., 2019), technological spillover (Kostovet-
sky and Manconi, 2020), and financing friction (Cici et al., 2015; Ojeda, 2018).
Among all these studies, my paper is most closely related to research about the
impact of common ownership on vertically related firms. For example, Freeman
(2021) shows that vertical common ownership can improve duration of relation-
ships between suppliers and customers and tests innovative collaborations as a
potential channel. My study differs from prior studies in this area by (a) exam-
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ining the impact of vertical common ownership on different aspects of corporate
innovation activities and (b) exploring potential channels for the results.
Among all the studies in this area, my paper is most relevant to Geng et al.
(2017)’s work. They define companies with cited patents as upstream firms and
define companies with patents citing the upstream firms as downstream firms.
They then examine how the joint ownership of upstream and downstream firms
mitigates patent hold-up problems. In contrast, my paper studies the joint own-
ership of suppliers and their customers along the supply chain.
Hold-up Problem The hold-up problem as first described by Williamson (1975)
and Klein et al. (1978) has been accepted by economists as a determinant of corpo-
rate underinvestment (e.g., Ellingsen and Johannesson, 2004). A hold-up problem
occurs to the party in a transaction with two factors: (1) relation-specific invest-
ments and (2) an incomplete contract (Rogerson, 1992). Factor (1) implies that
the investment produces (employs) customized products for specific customers
(from specific suppliers). The customized products largely increase the bargaining
power of the counterparty in the transaction, because if the counterparty ends
the transaction, the customized products and the related investment will devalue
substantially as it is difficult to use these products elsewhere. Ideally a complete
contract will preclude the potential counterparty opportunism.3 However, in real-
ity, because of bounded rationality and economic uncertainty, it is never possible
to write a complete contract ex-ante.4 Together with factor (1), factor (2) im-
plies that, under an incomplete contract, there could be chances for a contractual
party to act opportunistically, thereby leading to significant losses for the counter-
party with relation-specific investment for this transaction. Such a situation will
3Williamson (1975) defines opportunism as an effort to realize individual gains with guile in
transactions. It can have two types. The first type happens at the initial negotiation stage. One
party can strategically disclose incomplete or distorted information to write the contract to her
own advantage. The second type manifests itself during contract execution and renewal. The
contractual parties may behave irresponsibly when lack of monitoring, or may pose problems at
the contract renewal interval due to first-mover advantage. In particular, the first-mover advan-
tage here means that winners of original bids acquire firm-specific experience which places them
at a cost advantage in relation to non-winners on subsequent rounds of negotiation (Williamson,
1971).
4Bounded rationality refers to limited capacities of individuals to receive, store, retrieve, and
process information without error. With cognitive limits, the economic actors cannot write
contracts of unlimited complexity that would specify all possible contingencies in an economic
exchange.
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definitely deter relation-specific investment.
A well-known example of the hold-up problem for the customer side is between
General Motors (GM) and Fisher Body (Hart, 1995). Fisher Body was the only
company to deliver the components according to GM’s specification. In 1920, a
sharp increase in demand occurred that was above the contractual expectation.
It is claimed that Fisher Body held up GM by increasing the price for additional
parts produced. My study is related more to the hold-up problem for the supplier
side. A good example is that ship-leasing firms (threaten to) cancel (already
established) shipbuilding contracts with shipyards because of “non-permissible”
delay on production due to COVID-19.5
Since it is costly to write a comprehensive contract listing all specific rights
over assets in the contract, Grossman and Hart (1986) suggest, in their seminal
theoretical work, that it may be optimal to let one contractual party purchase
all residual rights in the form of ownership. Therefore, ownership integration is a
way to reduce opportunistic behavior and hold-up problems under the condition
of ex-ante incomplete contracting (Hart and Moore, 1990). Lafontaine and Slade
(2007) review the studies on the effects of vertical integration. In the absence of
vertical integration, Fee et al. (2006) show that partial equity holdings can also
improve relationships along the supply chain. My paper differs from other studies
in this area by assessing a different type of integration in the form of common
ownership.
It is empirically challenging to test the hold-up problem since it occurs under
unobservable conditions. Martin and Otto (2017) is one of the very few studies
to empirically test the effect of a hold-up problem. In particular, they use tariff
changes in suppliers’ industries as a shock for customers’ hold-up issues, and study
how customers respond in terms of investment. In contrast, my research examines
suppliers’ responses to various levels of hold-up problems, and focuses on a special
type of investment: investment in innovation activities.
5Pandemic, such as COVID-19, is not specifically defined as a permissible situation for pro-
duction delay in shipbuilding contracts, especially under English law. More details can be found
in BIMCO’s explanations on its website. BIMCO is the largest of the international shipping
associations representing shipowners.
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Supply Chain Similar to studies on the hold-up problem, studies on the role of
supply-chain relationships in corporate finance also stem from the seminal theo-
retical studies on transaction costs between upstream and downstream firms (e.g.,
Williamson, 1975; Hart and Moore, 1990). The literature in this area extends
the empirical analysis to more specific determinants of supply-chain relation-
ships besides corporate integration, such as mergers and acquisitions (Fee and
Thomas, 2004; Shahrur, 2005), partial integration (Fee et al., 2006), financial dis-
tress (Hertzel et al., 2008), anti-takeover measures (Cen et al., 2016b), and CEO
turnovers (Intintoli et al., 2017). Another stream of this literature examines how
supply-chain relationships may influence corporate financial decisions, such as cap-
ital structure (Kale and Shahrur, 2007; Banerjee et al., 2008; Chu, 2012) and the
cost of debt (Cen et al., 2016a).
The literature on the impacts of supply-chain relationships on corporate fi-
nancial decisions is relatively scarce, especially concerning their impacts on real
investment activities. Among all the studies in this area, my paper is most closely
related to Chu et al. (2019)’s work. They demonstrate that geographic proximity
between suppliers and customers can improve corporate innovation. My research
differs from their work by studying how improved supplier-customer relationships,
due to common ownership, can influence innovation.
Corporate Innovation Manso (2011)’s theoretical study suggests that corpo-
rate innovation can be facilitated by (1) tolerance of failures and (2) timely feed-
back on performance. The empirical literature has widely studied how variations
in ownership structure could affect corporate innovation through several potential
channels: mergers and acquisitions (Bena and Li, 2014; Seru, 2014), formation
of strategic alliances (Chemmanur et al., 2016), venture capital (Tian and Wang,
2014; Chemmanur et al., 2014), and hedge fund activism (Brav et al., 2018). My
paper examines the impact on corporate innovation of a new form of ownership
structure, common ownership, and tests feedback between suppliers and customers
as a potential channel. The work is most closely related to Anton et al. (2018)’s
work. They theoretically analyze the impact of horizontal common ownership on
corporate innovation. In contrast, this paper is the first one to empirically test
12
the impact of vertical common ownership on innovation.
Regulation Implications The potential anti-competitive effects of common
ownership have led to controversies over proposals for related regulations. Em-
pirical studies have documented increases in product prices or decreased market
entry due to common ownership in different sectors, such as airlines (Azar et al.,
2018), banking (Azar et al., 2019), and pharmaceuticals (Newham et al., 2018).
Some legal scholars claim that common ownership may disincentivize output and
employment and increase economic inequality, so they propose strong anti-trust
scrutiny for common owners (Elhauge, 2015; Posner et al., 2017; Scott Morton
and Hovenkamp, 2017).
On the contrary, some scholars suggest that the common ownership scrutiny
should not be implemented for all investors, especially index funds (Bebchuk and
Hirst, 2019). Index fund managers have weak incentives to engage in stewardship
because their contributions to improve held firms’ performances will invite free-
riding by other investors. In addition, index fund managers have incentives to
defer to the preferences of corporate managers because of potential business ties
with corporate managers of the firms in portfolios (e.g., having the index funds
included in the menu of investment options for 401(k) plans).
My paper reports a bright side of common ownership, which implies poten-
tially helpful regulatory measures: regulators may wish to encourage institutional
investors to hold equities in different sectors along the supply chain.
Development of Hypotheses
The main hypothesis is that vertical common ownership can enhance suppliers’
innovation performance by improving the relationship between suppliers and their
customers. In particular, I hypothesize that vertical common ownership can influ-
ence suppliers’ innovation through three potential channels.
The first channel is hold-up mitigation channel. In my analytical framework,
hold-up problems happen when suppliers invest in production of relation-specific
products. This situation can potentially decrease the bargaining power of sup-
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pliers because it is hard to sell these specialized products to other customers.6
Therefore, customers may act opportunistically in their relationship with sup-
pliers. For example, they may attempt to push down the prices of specialized
inputs or (threaten to) cancel the order during a negative demand shock. These
potential hold-up issues will lead to underinvestment in relation-specific invest-
ments/innovations. However, theoretical studies (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986;
Hart and Moore, 1990) suggest that joint asset ownership, such as common own-
ership, can mitigate the hold-up issues. Therefore, I hypothesize that vertical
common ownership can improve suppliers’ innovation performance by mitigating
hold-up issues between suppliers and their customers.
The second channel is a technological spillover channel. Both theoretical and
empirical studies (e.g., Manso, 2011; Chu et al., 2019) suggest that the exchange
of information about innovation activities can improve corporate innovation per-
formance. Past studies also suggest that common ownership can improve rates
of information exchange about corporate innovation activities. For example, Kos-
tovetsky and Manconi (2020) show that common ownership can increase cross-
citations between patents assigned to firms held in the same portfolio. Therefore,
I hypothesize that vertical common ownership can improve suppliers’ innovation
performance by improving technological spillovers between suppliers and their cus-
tomers.
The third channel is a vertical creative destruction channel. Vertical creative
destruction describes a situation where innovations by suppliers can devalue cus-
tomers’ assets-in-place (Gofman et al., 2020). For example, Nvidia supplies Graph-
ics Processing Units (GPUs) to Amazon for its Amazon Web Services (AWS). AWS
then uses Nvidia’s GPUs to accelerate artificial intelligence and high performance
computing workloads. An updated version of these GPUs, due to technological
improvements by Nvidia, can devalue the existing old versions of GPUs used by
Amazon. Theoretically, common owners tend to internalize all types of externali-
ties imposed on the firms held in the same portfolio (Hansen and Lott, 1996), so
they might also react to the negative effect due to vertical creative destruction.
6These relation-specific products can also cause hold-up issues for customers. In my data
sample, however, a lot of the customers are retailers without investment in relation-specific
inputs. It is thus easier for customers to get rid of the customized products because they do not
have to suffer from a loss of sunk costs due to any relation-specific investments.
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The impact of vertical creative destruction is strongest for capital-goods producers,
so I hypothesize that vertical common ownership can weaken innovation activities,
especially for suppliers in capital-producing industries.
15
III. DATA AND VARIABLE CONSTRUCTION
Sample Construction
The data sample is constructed from variables in four databases: Compustat Seg-
ment Customer, Thomson Reuters 13F, Stoffman et al. (2019)’s patent dataset,
and Kogan et al. (2017)’s patent dataset. Supplier-customer relationships are iden-
tified from the Compustat Segment Customer database. According to the FASB
14 (1976) and 131 (1997), public firms are required to disclose customers who ac-
count for at least 10% of their total sales. Some firms may opt to report significant
customers below this threshold as well. The Segment database includes the names
of corporate customers, as well as the supplier’s sales to each of its customers.
Data on institutional ownership are drawn from the Thomson Reuters 13F
database. This database includes institutional investors with over $100 milllion in
assets under management. These institutions include pension funds, endowments,
insurance companies, bank trusts, mutual funds, hedge funds and independent
advisors. These data go back to 1980, and report holding fractions for each firm
at fund family level at the end of each quarter. For a given firm, if its fiscal year
end is not at quarter end, I use institutional holdings at the nearest quarter end
prior to its fiscal year end to construct variables developed from information in
this database.
Data on patents are drawn from the datasets constructed by Stoffman et al.
(2019) and Kogan et al. (2017). Stoffman et al. (2019)’s dataset matches patent
numbers to firm identifier variables (CRSP “permco”) from 1926 to 2017. This
resource provides patent application dates and estimated market values of patents.
Kogan et al. (2017)’s dataset provides information on patent cross-citations. In
particular, this dataset matches the citing patent numbers with the cited patent
numbers from 1926 to 2010.
I generate supplier-level common ownership measures on the basis of the Seg-
ment and 13F datasets, and merge them with firm-level innovation variables gener-
ated from the datasets provided by Stoffman et al. (2019) and Kogan et al. (2017).
Then I merge the resulting data, by firm, with fundamental accounting variables
from Compustat. I exclude utility firms (SIC code from 4900 to 4999) and finan-
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cial firms (SIC code from 6000 to 6999) from the estimating sample because these
two industries are highly regulated. I delete all the innovation-inactive firms that
have no R&D expenditure or patent applications throughout the sample period.
All variables in the form of ratios are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles to
minimize distortions due to outliers. This variable construction procedure results




Following the recent literature on common ownership (e.g. He and Huang, 2017;
Lewellen and Lowry, 2020), I first construct my firm-pair level measure of com-
mon ownership along a supply chain (i.e., vertical common ownership), called
pairwise V CO, as:




where there are F institutions holding both supplier s and its customer c. βfs(c)t
denotes institution f ’s holding fraction of supplier s (customer c) in year t. The
value of pairwise V CO is higher when there are more common owners and/or
when these common owners hold higher fractions of suppliers and/or customers.





wct · pairwise V COsct,
where there are C customers for supplier s. The weight wct denotes customer c’s
relative share among all the supplier’s customers in year t. I employ both equal
weights and value weights on the basis of sales value between the supplier and
each customer.
Figure 1 displays the time series for the average number of institutions that
are commonly holding each supplier-customer pair in the data sample from 1980
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to 2010. Figure 2 displays the time series of average common owners’ holding
fractions of suppliers and customers from 1980 to 2010. Figure 3 displays the time
series of average vertical common ownership from 1980 to 2010. The market-level
vertical common ownership in the graph is the average V CO weighted by firm
market value. There are clear increasing trends in the number of common owners
and holding fractions of both suppliers and customers. Consistently, the value of
average V CO also exhibits an increasing trend over the sample period.
Figure 1. Average number of institutions holding each supplier-customer pair
from 1980 to 2010.
Figure 2. Average common owners’ holding fractions of suppliers and
customers from 1980 to 2010.
Innovation Measures
As mentioned earlier in Introduction, corporate innovation activities are typically
measured along three dimensions: innovation input, quantity of innovation output,
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Figure 3. Average vertical common ownership (weighted by firm size) from
1980 to 2010.
and quality of innovation output. Innovation input is measured by R&D Intensity,
which is R&D expenditures per unit of sales.
The quantity of innovation output is measured by the number of patent ap-
plications submitted (and eventually granted) at the firm-year level. On average,
there is more than a two-year lag between applications and grant years. The
recorded application year thus better captures the actual time of innovation than
the eventual grant year.
Many innovation studies use a patent’s subsequent lifetime citations as the
proxy for quality of innovation output. By that measure, however, the number of
citations for patents filed near the end of sample period is highly truncated. Hall
et al. (2001) therefore attempt to mitigate the truncation problem by adjusting
subsequent citations based on structural models. However, the current literature
empirically demonstrates that this adjustment method does not work particular
well (Dass et al., 2017). Kogan et al. (2017) provide another proxy for the quality
of innovation output by measuring the market response to patent grants. In this
study, the quality of innovation output is measured by the average market value
of patents at the firm-year level. Kogan et al. (2017) and Stoffman et al. (2019)
estimate these patent market values and provide the data used in this analysis.
Control Variables
To net out any potential confounding effects from other institutional ownership
measures, I control for the percentage of total institutional holdings (IO) and
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the concentration of institutional holdings (IO HHI) at the firm level. Following
other studies in the innovation literature (e.g., Atanassov and Liu, 2019), I control
for other firm-level variables including Q, firm size measured by sales, as well as
leverage, profitability, and capital intensity. More details about control variable
construction are in Appendix VI..
Summary Statistics
Table 2 reports summary statistics for the main variables used in this paper. An
average supplier has R&D intensity of 0.42 and 14.29 patent applications each year,
and each patent’s inferred market value averages $8.16 million. Given that the
innovation measures are skewed, I use shifted natural logarithms of these measures
in my analyses. The average value of vertical common ownership (VCO) is 0.0019.
On average, 27% of a supplier’s equity is held by institutional investors, and the
concentration of institutional holdings (i.e., HHI of institutional holding) is 0.14.7
7The market-level institutional holding percentage (market-cap weighted average) increases
from around 30% to around 60% from 1980 to 2010. However, the institutional holding percent-
ages are higher for large market-cap firms, and the supplier firms in my sample in general are
small in size. Therefore, the average firm-level institutional ownership percentage in the sample
period is relatively small.
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Table 2. This table reports summary statistics for the main variables used in
this paper. R&D Intensity is R&D expenditure scaled by sales. #pat is the
number of patent applications (for patents eventually granted) at the firm-year
level. Avg.xi is the average market value of patents at the firm-year level. V CO
is the supplier-level vertical common ownership, which is calculated as the
weighted average of supplier-customer-pair-level common ownership for each
supplier. I use both equal weights (EW) and value weights (VW) on the basis of
sales from a supplier to each of its customers. IO is the percentage of total
institutional holdings. IO HHI is the proxy for institutional ownership
concentration, which is calculated as the Herfindahl–Hirschman Index of
institutional holdings. Q is market value of total assets divided by book value of
total assets. Capital Intensity is net PPE divided by total assets. Profitability
is EBITDA divided by total assets. Leverage is total debt divided by total
assets.
count mean s.d. min p50 max
Innovation
ln(1 +R&D Intensity) 17,045 0.210 0.409 0 0.066 2.432
R&D Intensity 17,045 0.421 1.345 0 0.068 10.38
ln(1 + #pat) 17,063 1.022 1.346 0 0.693 8.175
#pat 17,063 14.29 90.69 0 1 3549
ln(1 + Avg.xi) 17,063 0.953 1.269 0 0.254 6.484
Avg.xi ($mil) 17,063 8.160 31.78 0 0.289 653.4
Common Ownership
V CO (EW) 17,063 0.002 0.003 0 0.001 0.015
V CO (VW) 17,063 0.002 0.003 0 0.001 0.016
Controls
IO HHI 17,063 0.141 0.207 0 0.064 1
IO 17,063 0.270 0.292 0 0.167 1.000
Q 15,770 2.405 2.241 0.585 1.628 14.18
ln(Sales) 17,043 4.452 2.248 -4.135 4.321 11.63
Capital Intensity 17,057 0.219 0.162 0.009 0.182 0.719
Profitability 17,019 0.011 0.285 -1.359 0.096 0.426
Leverage 17,000 0.196 0.234 0 0.128 1.288
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IV. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN COMMON
OWNERSHIP AND SUPPLIERS’ INNOVATION
ACTIVITIES
Baseline Regressions and Results
To assess the relationship between vertical common ownership and suppliers’ in-
novation activities, I estimate the baseline regression:
Innovationit = β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit,
where Innovation is one of the innovation activity measures (i.e., ln(1+R&D Intensity),
ln(1 + #pat), and ln(1 + Avg.xi)), V CO is the supplier-level proxy for vertical
common ownership on the basis of both equal weights and sales-value weights,
and X is a vector of control variables that could systematically affect corporate
innovation activities.8 All explanatory variables are lagged one year to mitigate
simultaneity. The αi captures firm-level fixed effects which control for any observ-
able or unobservable heterogeneity across firms that affect innovation activities
(e.g. corporate culture that encourages innovation). The αt capture year fixed
effects which rule out spurious associations between vertical common ownership
and innovation activities due to their aggregate time trends. Standard errors are
clustered at the industry level in case variations of firm-level innovation activities
are correlated within industries because of industry-level technological innovation
shocks or technological collaboration among peer firms in the industry.
Table 3 reports the results of baseline regressions. Columns (1) and (2) show
the results when the dependent variable is innovation input, ln(1+R&D Intensity),
with equally weighted and value-weighted V CO. The coefficient estimates on the
two types of V CO are both positive and statistically significant at the 5% level,
suggesting a positive association between a supplier’s vertical common ownership
and the supplier’s innovation input. The economic effect is sizeable: a one stan-
dard deviation increase in equally (value-) weighted V CO is associated with a
8The data on patent market values are estimated and provided by Kogan et al. (2017). They
denote patent market value as xi.
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2.32% (1.57%) increase in R&D intensity.
Columns (3) and (4) show the results when the dependent variable is the
quantity of innovation output measured by ln(1+#pat). The coefficient estimates
on the two types of V CO are again positive and statistically significant at the
1% level, suggesting a positive association between a supplier’s vertical common
ownership and the supplier’s quantity of innovation output. The effect is also
economically large: a one standard deviation increase in equally (value-) weighted
V CO is associated with a 9.35% (9.21%) increase in the number of successful
patent applications.
Lastly, columns (5) and (6) show the results when the dependent variable is
the quality of innovation output measured by ln(1 + Avg.xi). The coefficient
estimates on the two types of V CO are still positive and statistically significant
at the 1% level, suggesting a positive association between a supplier’s vertical
common ownership and the supplier’s quality of innovation output. The economic
effect is large: a one standard deviation increase of equally (value-) weighted V CO
is associated with a 5.14% (5.10%) increase in average patent market value, which
corresponds to a $0.42 million increase in value.
Overall, the baseline results in Table 3 show that, on average, a supplier’s
vertical common ownership has a significant effect on the supplier’s innovation
activities. Suppliers’ innovation input, quantity and quality of innovation output
all rise significantly when the value of suppliers’ vertical common ownership in-
creases. Based on the construction of V CO, a higher value of vertical common
ownership implies that more institutions hold higher fractions of equities in both
the supplier and its customers.
Identification using Mergers of Financial Institutions
The baseline regression results provide evidence concerning significant associations
between vertical common ownership and supplier innovation activities. However,
there are still several qualifications with respect to these findings. First, these
specifications cannot exclude other unobservable confounding factors that covary
with common ownership. Second, they cannot exclude the possibility of reverse
causality. It is possible that common owners intentionally search for, and invest
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Table 3. This table reports the baseline regression results for the model:
Innovationit = β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit.
The dependent variables are ln(1 +R&D Intensity) in columns (1) and (2),
ln(1 + #pat) in columns (3) and (4), and ln(1 + Avg.xi) in columns (5) and (6).
The supplier-level variable V CO is the equally weighted average of
supplier-customer-pair-level vertical common ownership in columns (1), (3) and
(5); and the sales-value weighted average in columns (2), (4) and (6). Details
about the control variables are in Appendix VI.. Both firm and year fixed effects
are included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
ln(1 +R&D Intensity) ln(1 + #pat) ln(1 + Avg.xi)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V CO 2.290** 1.496** 29.114*** 27.771*** 15.271*** 14.645***
(2.458) (2.576) (3.453) (3.319) (3.064) (2.861)
IO HHI -0.031 -0.030 -0.009 -0.009 0.067 0.066
(-1.358) (-1.358) (-0.192) (-0.195) (1.515) (1.513)
IO 0.081* 0.084* 0.051 0.057 0.236** 0.239**
(1.750) (1.727) (0.428) (0.480) (2.173) (2.166)
Q -0.008* -0.008* 0.017** 0.017** 0.039*** 0.039***
(-1.728) (-1.728) (2.108) (2.101) (6.159) (6.165)
ln(Sales) -0.067** -0.066** 0.270*** 0.270*** 0.172*** 0.172***
(-2.054) (-2.059) (4.070) (4.061) (10.841) (10.686)
Capital Intensity 0.020 0.020 0.030 0.032 0.053 0.054
(0.647) (0.642) (0.242) (0.256) (0.399) (0.406)
Profitability -0.079*** -0.079*** -0.268*** -0.268*** -0.061 -0.061
(-2.664) (-2.662) (-4.244) (-4.239) (-1.178) (-1.178)
Leverage -0.074** -0.074** -0.360*** -0.359*** -0.177*** -0.177***
(-2.440) (-2.450) (-5.701) (-5.711) (-3.355) (-3.334)
Constant 0.496*** 0.495*** -0.156 -0.157 0.077 0.076
(3.292) (3.299) (-0.470) (-0.472) (1.055) (1.033)
Observations 11,857 11,857 11,866 11,866 11,866 11,866
R-squared 0.832 0.832 0.815 0.814 0.774 0.774
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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in, firms with better innovation performances. Therefore, I follow the current lit-
erature (e.g., He and Huang, 2017; Azar et al., 2018) to implement an event study
based on financial institution mergers and acquisitions (M&As) to more rigor-
ously assess the causality between variations in common ownership and changes
in supplier innovation activities.
Quasi-Experimental Design
M&As among financial institutions are plausibly exogenous shocks relative to com-
mon ownership. M&As allow the acquirers to hold more firms, or higher fractions
of firms, in their portfolios, thereby leading to mechanical increments in common
ownership for the firms in the merged portfolios. This quasi-experimental design
satisfies the exclusion condition. For financial institutions, the reasons for M&As
are complex, but are not likely to be driven mainly by these firms’ intentions to
affect corporate innovation activities. In addition, I consider multiple events to
permit tests of the average effects of these shocks. Even if some of the M&As
could be driven mainly by a desire to affect the corporate innovation of firms in
their portfolios, such idiosyncratic cases are unlikely to have significant impacts on
the overall average result. Thus, concerns about endogeneity when using financial
institutions M&As to study corporate innovation are likely to be minimized.
I follow He and Huang (2017) to identify instances of M&As in financial in-
stitutions, in the 30 years from 1980 to 2010, from the Capital IQ dataset. The
sample inclusion criteria are:
1. The merger is between two 13F institutions (or their parent firms) in the
financial sector (with primary SIC codes in the 6000 to 6999 range) and
announced during the period between 1980 and 2010;
2. The merger is completed within one year after the initial announcement;
3. The target institution stops filing 13F forms within one year after the com-
pletion of the deal.
Altogether, I collect 51 such events between 1980 and 2010. The names of acquirers
and targets, the announcement dates, and the effective dates are listed in Appendix
VI..
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I follow Azar et al. (2018)’s method to identify the treated group by check-
ing the implied changes of common ownership for each firm. First, I calculate
counterfactual V CO in the year before the announcement year of M&As as if
the M&As had already happened at that time. Then, the differences between
the counterfactual V CO and real V CO are defined as “implied changes in V CO”
(∆V CO). Firms are categorized on the basis of ∆V CO: the firms in the top
tercile of ∆V CO are considered to be treated firms, and the firms in the bottom
tercile of ∆V CO are considered to be control firms. I calculate ∆V CO on the
basis of pre-merger hypothetical V CO, rather than post-merger actual V CO, be-
cause this method constructs an ex-ante measure of mechanical changes of V CO
due to institutional mergers. The hypothetical pre-merger V CO is less endoge-
nous than the actual post-merger V CO because it is less likely to be influenced
by the investors’ reaction to the merger during the event year.
Appendix VI. shows that there are M&A events in consecutive years, and
the treatment effects could last for multiple years. Therefore, the observations
in a given event can be affected by (lagged) treatment effects of other events.
In particular, the distortions due to treatment effects of other events would be
potentially reflected from three perspectives. First, in the pre-event window of a
given event, some firms in the treatment or control group could be in the treatment
groups in other events. As a result, for this specific event, the parallel trends
between treatment and control groups in the pre-event window will no longer
hold. Second, in the post-event window of a given event, some firms in the control
group could be in the treatment groups in other events. As a result, for this
specific event, the difference between control and treatment groups in the post-
event window will be biased downward. Third, in the post-event window of a
given event, some firms in the treatment group could be in the treatment groups
in other events. As a result, for this specific event, the difference between control
and treatment groups in the post-event window will be biased upward.
To mitigate the distortions due to other events, I follow Gormley and Matsa
(2011)’s method to stack the data sample of multiple events. First, a 5-year pre-
event and 5-year post-event window is set around each merger. For a specific
merger, any firms that are treated by other mergers within the 11-year window
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are dropped. Thereby a data sample for the specific merger is constructed. Then,
I stack the constructed data samples for all the mergers into one dataset.
DiD Regressions and Results
The treated firms are exposed to higher common ownership increments due to the
financial institutions M&As, so I expect that these events will lead the treated
firms to have a larger increase in innovation input and output. I run the following
difference-in-differences (DiD) regression to test the hypothesis:
Innovationijt = β0 + β1 · Treatmentij × Postjt + β2 ·Xij,t + αij + αtj + εijt,
where Treatmentij is a dummy variable that equals one if firm i is the treated
firm in merger j. Postjt is a dummy variable that equals one if year t is in the
post-event period for merger j. X is the vector of control variables. The institu-
tional ownership concentration (IO HHI) and the percentage of total institutional
holdings (IO) are excluded from the vector of control variables because they are
directly affected by the treatment. Both firm-merger and time-merger fixed ef-
fects are controlled.9 Standard errors are clustered at the merger level to mitigate
the concern that innovations by firms in the same institutional merger might be
correlated.
Table 4 reports the results of these DiD regressions. The treated firms are
identified based on both equally weighted and value-weighted ∆V COs. The re-
sults for both models with and without control variables are reported and they
are largely similar to each other. For all innovation measures, the estimated coef-
ficients on Treatmentij × Postjt are positive and significant. This result suggests
that treated firms (i.e., those whose common ownership increases due to finan-
cial institution mergers) exhibit a greater increase in innovation input and output
than control firms. In terms of economic significance, the estimated coefficients on
Treatmentij × Postjt in columns (1) and (3) indicate that treated firms, relative
to control firms, experience about 2% higher increase in R&D intensity, 9% higher
9The construction of stacked dataset discussed above will lead to duplicate firm-year obser-
vations, because the same firm-year observations can serve as treated/control observations in
data samples for different mergers. Therefore, it is necessary to control firm/year-merger fixed
effects.
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increase in patent applications, and 9% higher increase in average patent value
during the five years after the financial institution mergers, compared to the five
years before the merger.
Table 4. This table reports the DiD regression results for the model:
Innovationijt = β0 + β1 · (Treatmentij × Postjt) + β2 ·Xijt + αij + αtj + εijt.
The dependent variables are ln(1 +R&D Intensity) in Panel A, ln(1 + #pat) in
Panel B, and ln(1 + Avg.xi) in Panel C. Treatmentij is a dummy variable that
equals one if firm i is a treated firm in merger j. Postjt is a dummy variable that
equals one if year t is in post-event period for merger j. The treated firms are
those in the top tercile of ∆V CO, while the control firms are those in the
bottom tercile of ∆V CO. ∆V CO is the difference between (1) the hypothetical
V CO assuming the merger had already happened in the year before
annoucement and (2) the actual V CO in the year before the announcement. The
treated firms are identified based on eqaully weighted ∆V CO in columns (1) and
(2), and on sales-value-weighted ∆V CO in columns (3) and (4). X is a vector of
control variables. Results of DiD regressions without control variables are
reported in columns (1) and (3). Both firm-merger and time-merger fixed effects
are employed. Standard errors are clustered at the merger level. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EW EW VW VW
Panel A ln(1 +R&D Intensity)
Treatment× Post 0.015** 0.027*** 0.018** 0.028***











Observations 49,244 43,478 49,244 43,478
R-squared 0.757 0.818 0.757 0.818
Firm-merger FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-merger FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 4. (continued).
(1) (2) (3) (4)
EW EW VW VW
Panel B ln(1 + #pat)
Treatment× Post 0.098*** 0.059*** 0.089*** 0.058***











Observations 49,330 43,478 49,330 43,478
R-squared 0.762 0.832 0.762 0.832
Firm-merger FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-merger FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C ln(1 + Avg.xi)
Treatment× Post 0.089*** 0.078*** 0.086*** 0.081***











Observations 49,330 43,478 49,330 43,478
R-squared 0.731 0.788 0.731 0.788
Firm-merger FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-merger FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
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IV Regressions and Results
In this subsection, I complement the DiD analysis above with an instrument vari-
able (IV) strategy to obtain a quantitative estimate of the effect of the VCO on
suppliers’ innovation activities from the variation generated by the financial in-
stitutional mergers. I run specifications with the difference between average log
innovation variables in the periods before and after the mergers as the dependent
variable, and the difference between average VCO in percentage in the periods
before and after the mergers as the main explanatory variable. I control merger
fixed effects and all control variables in the baseline regression. All the control
variables are evaluated in the year prior to the mergers. I instrument the main
explanatory variable with the treatment dummy constructed using the top and
bottom terciles of the implied change in VCO, as in the DiD analysis above.10 In
particular, the first-stage regression is as follow:
∆post−preV COij = δ1 · Treatmentij +Xij,−1 + αj + εij,
where ∆post−preV CO denotes the difference between the average VCO in the five









V COij,tpre × 100
5
.
And the second-stage regression is
∆post−preinnovationij = δ2 · ̂∆post−preV COij +Xij,−1 + αj + εij,
where ∆post−preinnovationij denotes the difference between the average log inno-
vation variables in the five years after the mergers and the average log innovation
10The raw implied change in VCO could also be used as the instrument. The benefit of
using implied change in VCO as the instrument is that it makes use of more variation. But it
potentially has more measurement error.
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Panel A of Table 5 reports the result of first-stage regression. The treatment
dummy works as a strong instrument for the difference between average VCOs
before and after the mergers. Specifically, the p-values from underidentification
tests are smaller than 1%, and the F-statistics from weak identification tests are
around 75. The coefficient estimates for the instrument variable suggest that,
compared with the control firms, the increase in the average VCO of the treated
firms in the five years after the mergers is around 0.07 percentage point higher.
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results of second-stage regressions. These results
show positive and significant effects of the instrumented change in the VCO on
the change in innovation. Multiplying the coefficients on ̂∆post−preV CO by the
coefficient on Treatment in the first-stage regression, the results suggest that
compared with the control firms, the increase in R&D intensity of the treated
firms after the mergers is about 4% higher, the increase in the number of applied
patents is around 9% higher, and the increase in the average patent value is around
12% higher. These estimates are consistent with the results from the DiD analysis.
Testing the Parallel Trends Assumption
One crucial condition for the DiD approach to be appropriate is the assumption
of parallel trends between the treatment and control groups in the pre-event pe-
riod. I verify this assumption by comparing the average growth of the innovation
measures for treated versus control firms during the five years prior to the insti-
tutional mergers. Table 6 reports the results of t-tests for differences between the
average changes in innovation variables between treatment and control groups in
pre-event period. The treated firms are identified using both equally weighted
and value-weighted ∆V COs. The p-values associated with the test statistics for
these t-tests suggest that there are no significant differences of average changes in
the innovation variable between treatment and control groups in pre-event period.
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Table 5. Panel A of this table reports the first-stage IV regression results for
the model:
∆post−preV COij = δ1 · Treatmentij +Xij,−1 + αj + εij.
∆post−preV CO measures the difference between average VCO in the periods
before and after the mergers. The instrument variable is the treatment dummy
constructed using the top and bottom terciles of the implied change in VCO, as
in the DiD analysis. Panel B of this table reports the second-stage regression
results for the model:
∆post−preinnovationij = δ2 · ̂∆post−preV COij +Xij,−1 + αj + εij.
∆post−preinnovation measures the difference between average log innovation
variables in the periods before and after the mergers. In Panel B, the log
innovation variables are ln(1 +R&D Intensity) columns (1) and (2),
ln(1 + #pat) in columns (3) and (4), and ln(1 + Avg.xi) in columns (5) and (6).
X is a vector of all control variables used in baseline regression evaluated in the
year before the mergers. ∆post−preV CO and Treatment are constructed based on
both equally weighted and sale-value-weighted VCO. Merger fixed effects are
employed. Standard errors are clustered at the merger level. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.




















Merger FE Yes Yes
P-val. 0.0000 0.0000
(Underidentification Test)




Panel B ∆ln(1 +R&D Intensity) ∆ln(1 + #pat) ∆ln(1 + Avg.xi)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
̂∆post−preV CO 0.626** 0.703*** 1.329*** 1.256*** 1.698*** 1.701***
(2.485) (2.769) (3.412) (3.052) (4.190) (3.965)
IO−1 -0.242*** -0.243*** 0.072 0.069 0.134** 0.132**
(-4.053) (-4.141) (1.470) (1.387) (2.312) (2.193)
IO HHI−1 -0.260** -0.259** -0.123*** -0.122*** -0.045 -0.044
(-2.319) (-2.298) (-3.049) (-3.039) (-0.995) (-0.980)
Q−1 -0.004 -0.005 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.008 0.008
(-0.353) (-0.432) (3.853) (3.839) (1.388) (1.250)
ln(Sales)−1 0.017* 0.016 -0.015 -0.015 -0.007 -0.009
(1.905) (1.679) (-0.964) (-0.964) (-0.787) (-0.956)
Capital Intensity−1 -0.631*** -0.634*** 0.086 0.060 0.171* 0.159*
(-4.690) (-4.666) (0.688) (0.463) (1.930) (1.706)
Profitability−1 0.831*** 0.829*** 0.370*** 0.370*** 0.133*** 0.132***
(8.975) (8.961) (8.137) (8.168) (3.695) (3.762)
Leverage−1 -0.118** -0.115** -0.137*** -0.133*** -0.081 -0.075
(-2.154) (-2.081) (-2.919) (-2.894) (-1.276) (-1.205)
Observations 4,200 4,200 5,026 5,026 5,026 5,026
R-squared 0.067 0.060 0.044 0.039 0.173 0.193
Merger FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Therefore, the parallel trends assumption is likely to hold in my setting.
Table 6. This table presents the test to verify the parallel trend assumption.
Columns (1) and (2) report the average changes in the innovation measures for
treated firms during the five years before financial institution mergers, while
columns (3) and (4) report the average changes in innovation measures for
control firms during the five years before the mergers. The treated and control
firms are identified based on equally weighted ∆V CO in columns (1) and (3),
and based on sales-value-weighted ∆V CO in columns (2) and (4). Columns (5)
and (6) report the differences in means of innovation measures between
treatment and control groups. Columns (7) and (8) report p-vlaues associated
with test statistics of t-tests for differences in means.
Changes in Pre-event Period Difference t-test
Treatment Mean Control Mean (1)-(3) (2)-(4) P-value P-value
EW VW EW VW EW VW EW VW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
ln(1 +R&D Intensity) -.001 -.001 -.016 -.017 .015 .016 .132 .123
ln(1 + #pat) .199 .195 .245 .253 -.046 -.058 .291 .187
ln(1 + Avg.xi) .242 .241 .291 .297 -.049 -.057 .282 .211
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Overall, the DiD and the IV analyses suggest that an exogenous increase in
a supplier’s vertical common ownership leads, on average, to greater amounts of
supplier innovation input and output. The findings provide plausible evidence for
a causal interpretation of the positive relation between vertical common ownership
and supplier innovation activities.
Additional Tests
Vertical vs. Horizontal Common Ownership
To assess whether there are different effects between vertical and horizontal com-
mon ownerships, I include a proxy for common ownership of competitors (i.e.,
horizontal common ownership) in the baseline regressions. Similar to the con-
struction of vertical common ownership, I first construct a firm-pair-level measure





where there are F institutions holding both firm i and its competitor j. βfi(j)t de-
notes institution f ’s holding fraction of firm i (competitor j) in year t. The value
of pairwise V CO is higher when there are more common owners and/or when
these common owners are holding higher fractions of firms and/or their competi-
tors. I use FIC500 code developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016) to identify
competitors.11




wjt · pairwise HCOijt,
where there are J competitors for firm i. The weight wjt denotes competitor j’s
11I do not use SIC codes because industry identification on the basis of SIC codes has multiple
issues. First, the industry of a conglomerate cannot be described by a single SIC. Second, firms
with the same SIC code are not necessarily competitors, but could be upstream and downstream
firms in the same industry. FIC codes mitigate these issues by introducing text-based industry
categorization. In particular, FIC codes group the firms into different industries based on the
similarity of their product descriptions in 10-K files. FIC500 categorizes firms in the market
into 500 industry groups. In untabulated results, I also use FIC300 and FIC400, and get similar
results.
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relative share among all the competitors in year t. I employ both equal weights
and weights on the basis of market value of each competitor.
Table 7 reports the results for models that also control for horizontal com-
mon ownership. Given that the needed FIC code is available only for 1996 and
later, the sample period for these models is from 1996 to 2010, and sample sizes
are smaller than baseline regressions. Panel A compares the effects of vertical
versus horizontal common ownership on innovation input as measured by R&D
Intensity. Columns (1) and (2) show that equally weighted and value-weighted
vertical common ownerships are positively associated with R&D Intensity at the
10% and 5% significance levels respectively. Columns (3) and (4) show that only
value-weighted horizontal common ownership is positively associated with R&D
Intensity, at the 1% significance level, if V CO is excluded from the model. It
implies that the impact of horizontal common ownership on R&D Intensity works
mainly through the common holdings of the large firms. When both vertical and
horizontal common ownership are included in the regressions, as in columns (5)
and (6), horizontal common ownership loses statistical significance, while equally
weighted and value-weighted vertical common ownerships still keep statistical sig-
nificance at 10% and 5% levels respectively. The coefficient magnitudes of vertical
common ownership are larger than those of horizontal common ownership in all
six columns. The vertical common ownership effect clearly dominates.
Panel B compares the effects between vertical and horizontal common own-
ership on suppliers’ quantity of innovation output as measured by ln(1 + #pat).
Columns (1) and (2) show that both equally weighted and value-weighted vertical
common ownerships are positively associated with ln(1 + #pat) at the 1% sig-
nificance level. Columns (3) and (4) show that both equally weighted and value-
weighted horizontal common ownerships are positively related to ln(1 + #pat)
at the 1% significance level as well, and the coefficient magnitudes of horizontal
common ownership are larger than those of vertical common ownership. When
both vertical and horizontal common ownerships are included in the regressions
in columns (5) and (6), both vertical and horizontal common ownerships retain
their statistical significances.
Lastly, Panel C compares the effects of vertical and horizontal common owner-
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ship on the quality of innovation output as measured by ln(1 +Avgxi). Columns
(1) and (2) show that equally weighted and value-weighted vertical common own-
ership are positively associated with ln(1 +Avgxi) at the 1% and 5% significance
levels respectively. Columns (3) and (4) show that both equally weighted and
value-weighted horizontal common ownership are also positively associated with
ln(1 + Avgxi) at the 10% significance level. When both vertical and horizon-
tal common ownerships are included in the regressions in columns (5) and (6),
horizontal common ownership loses statistical significance, while vertical common
ownership retains statistical significance at the 10% level, suggesting that the ef-
fect of V CO again dominates.
Table 7. This table reports the results for models that regress the innovation
activity measure on vertical common ownership, horizontal common ownership,
and both. The dependent variables are ln(1 +R&D Intensity) in Panel A,
ln(1 + #pat) in Panel B, and ln(1 + Avg.xi) in Panel C. The results for vertical
common ownership are in columns (1) and (2), those for horizontal common
ownership are in columns (3) and (4), and those for both are in columns (5) and
(6). Columns (1), (3), and (5) show the results with equally weighted common
ownership measures, and columns (2), (4), and (6) show the results with
value-weighted measures. All control variables, firm and year fixed effects are
included in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
Panel A ln(1 +R&D Intensity)
V CO 2.818* 1.851** 2.996* 1.588**
(1.896) (2.500) (1.756) (2.066)
HCO 0.942 1.606*** -0.860 0.814
(1.054) (2.833) (-0.563) (1.649)
Observations 6,237 6,237 6,237 6,237 6,237 6,237
R-squared 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847 0.847
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 7. (continued).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
Panel B ln(1 + #pat)
V CO 24.890*** 22.687*** 19.644** 13.346*
(3.495) (3.154) (2.605) (1.768)
HCO 34.036*** 30.346*** 19.318* 22.507***
(3.222) (4.834) (1.699) (3.611)
Observations 6,671 6,671 6,671 6,671 6,671 6,671
R-squared 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837 0.837
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C ln(1 + Avg.xi)
V CO 11.107*** 9.995** 9.033* 7.286*
(2.817) (2.548) (1.967) (1.752)
HCO 14.441* 10.681* 7.461 6.283
(1.710) (1.841) (0.773) (0.991)
Observations 6,673 6,673 6,673 6,673 6,673 6,673
R-squared 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779 0.779
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Overall, Table 7 shows that vertical common ownership has a more robust effect
on innovation input and quality of innovation output than does horizontal common
ownership. The magnitude of vertical common ownership’s impact on input to
innovation is consistently larger than that of horizontal common ownership. The
reason might be that there are two countervailing effects of horizontal common
ownership on corporate innovation: a positive effect from technology spillovers and
a negative business-stealing effect from competitors (Bloom et al., 2013; Anton
et al., 2018). In contrast, the impact of vertical common ownership on corporate
innovation has two positive effects: a positive technology-spillover effect, and a
positive effect from hold-up mitigation along the supply chain.
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Different Assumptions Concerning Shareholder Attention
Gilje, Gormley, and Levit (2019) construct their common ownership measure by
taking into account heterogeneous institutional attention to different firms in a
portfolio. In particular, a shareholder’s attention to a specific firm in her portfolio
is positively related to the “importance” of this firm, which is measured by the
weight of this firm in the shareholder’s portfolio. Gilje et al. (2019), hereafter GGL,
provide three different firm-pair measures of common ownership on the basis of
three different assumptions about shareholders’ attention:
(1) Linear attention: The shareholder’s attention is proportional to the weight
of a specific firm in her portfolio,
(2) Convex attention: The shareholder allocates more attention to the firm with
higher weight in her portfolio,
(3) Concave attention: The shareholder devotes less attention to the firm with
higher weight in her portfolio.





where there are C customers for supplier s in year t. GGLsct is the common
ownership measure for the pair consisting of supplier s and customer c in year t.
GGL can be constructed under three different assumptions of investors’ attention
as discussed above. More details about the construction of the GGL measures are
provided in Appendix VI.. The term wct denotes the weight of customer c. Both
equal weights and sales-value weights are employed. Following Gilje et al. (2019),
I also rescale the common ownership measures by the sample mean.
Table 8 reports the baseline regression results for alternative vertical common
ownership measures on the basis of different assumptions about shareholder at-
tention. Panel A shows positive and statistically significant relationships between
innovation input measured by ln(1 +R&D Intensity) and vertical common own-
ership measures under assumptions of linear attention and concave attention in
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columns (1), (2), (5) and (6). Panel B demonstrates positive and statistically
significant associations between the quantity of innovation output measured by
ln(1+#pat) and vertical common ownership measures, differentiated by the three
different assumptions about shareholder attention. Lastly, Panel C also displays
positive and statistically significant associations between the quality of innovation
output measured by ln(1 +Avg.xi) and the vertical common ownership measures
under assumptions of linear attention and concave attention in columns (1), (2),
(5) and (6).
Overall, the positive and statistically significant relationships between innova-
tion activities and supplier vertical common ownership are robust across models
that use alternative measures of common ownership and different assumptions
about the allocation of shareholder attention.
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Table 8. This table reports the regression results with alternative vertical
common ownership measures differentiated on the basis of shareholder attention
assumptions. The shareholder attention models and firm-pair level common
ownership measures are developed and provided by Gilje et al. (2019).
GGLV COst =
∑C
c=1wct ·GGLsct, where there are C customers for supplier s in
year t. GGLsct is the common ownership measure for the pair of supplier s and
customer c in year t. GGL can be constructed under three different assumptions
about investors’ attention: linear attention, concave attention, and convex
attention. More details about the construction of the GGL measures are
provided in Appendix VI.. wct denotes the weight of customer c. Both equal
weights and sales-value weights are employed. Following Gilje et al. (2019), I also
rescale the common ownership measures by the sample mean. The dependent
variables are ln(1 +R&D Intensity) in Panel A, ln(1 + #pat) in Panel B, and
ln(1 + Avg.xi) in Panel C. The estimated effects of vertical common ownership
in the case of linear shareholder attention are in columns (1) and (2), those with
convex shareholder attention are in columns (3) and (4), and those with concave
shareholder attention are in columns (5) and (6). Columns (1), (3), and (5) show
the results with equally weighted common ownership measures, and columns (2),
(4), and (6) show the results with value-weighted measures. All control variables,
firm and year fixed effects are included in all regressions. Standard errors are
clustered at the industry level. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below
coefficient estimates. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *,
**, and ***, respectively.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
Panel A ln(1 +R&D Intensity)
Linear Convex Concave
GGLV CO 0.001* 0.001* 0.000 0.000 0.003*** 0.002**
(1.777) (1.685) (1.102) (1.114) (2.637) (2.232)
Observations 11,857 11,857 11,857 11,857 11,857 11,857
R-squared 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.827 0.827
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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Table 8. (continued).
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
Panel B ln(1 + #pat)
Linear Convex Concave
GGLV CO 0.023*** 0.021*** 0.007*** 0.006* 0.047*** 0.043***
(3.272) (2.976) (2.005) (1.700) (3.529) (3.114)
Observations 11,866 11,866 11,866 11,866 11,866 11,866
R-squared 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.814 0.815 0.815
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Panel C ln(1 + Avg.xi)
Linear Convex Concave
GGLV CO 0.011** 0.010** 0.002 0.002 0.024*** 0.021**
(2.057) (1.998) (0.925) (0.941) (2.815) (2.609)
Observations 11,866 11,866 11,866 11,866 11,866 11,866
R-squared 0.774 0.774 0.774 0.774 0.775 0.775
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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V. VERTICAL COMMON OWNERSHIP AND
SUPPLIERS’ INNOVATION ACTIVITIES:
POTENTIAL CHANNELS
Baseline regressions and DiD analyses suggest that vertical common ownership
leads suppliers to improve their innovation input and output. This section explores
potential reasons why vertical common ownership may affect supplier innovation
activities: (1) a hold-up mitigation channel, (2) a technological spillover channel,
and (3) a vertical creative destruction channel.
Hold-up Mitigation Channel
The hold-up problem could emerge for a supplier when its customers act oppor-
tunistically towards the supplier’s relationship-specific innovation/products. The
customer opportunism could reduce the supplier’s incentives to invest in, and
thus generate, innovations. The hold-up problems are unobservable, therefore I
construct proxies for the scenarios that are related to the severities of potential
hold-up problems. In particular, a hold-up channel is examined from three per-
spectives: (1) a supplier’s vertical integration with its operating segments, (2) a
supplier’s bargaining power relative to its customers, and (3) the asset specificity
of inputs to a supplier’s customers.12
Vertically integrated firms are those for whom at least one of their operating
segments is in the downstream industry. When the customers of vertically in-
tegrated firms act or tend to act opportunistically, the segments in downstream
industries can at least temporarily function as “internal customers.” Therefore,
customer opportunism has less impact on vertically integrated suppliers.
When the market power of a supplier in its own industry is relatively stronger
than that of its customer in that customer’s industry, the bargaining power of the
12According to FASB 131, an operating segment is a component of an entity that (1) engages
in business activities from which it may earn revenues and incur expenses and (2) has discrete
financial information available. An operating segment’s operating results are reviewed regularly
by the entity’s chief operating decision maker to make decisions about resources to be allocated
to the segment and assess its performance. An operating segment could be a division, unit, or
department of a firm. Public firms are required to disclose information about their operating
segments.
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supplier is stronger vis-à-vis the customer. Strong market power of a supplier in
its industry implies that the supplier has relatively better production capability
than peer firms. Its products thus have relatively larger market share and more
stable quality control. If a customer switches to other less competitive suppliers,
the marginal cost for purchasing the input could be larger due to less accessibility
or potentially worse quality. From the customer side, weak market power in its
industry implies that the customer has relatively smaller market share than peer
firms, and therefore there will be less opportunity cost for its supplier to break
the relationship and transfer to other customers. In sum, it is less likely for the
customer to act opportunistically by threatening to transfer to other suppliers
that provide similar products. Suppliers with stronger bargaining power relative
to their customers therefore have fewer hold-up problems.
Customer opportunism arises mainly towards relationship-specific products be-
cause these customized products are hard to market or difficult to use for other
customers. When the input to customers can be more easily used in other indus-
tries (i.e., these assets have less asset specificity), it is less likely for the suppliers to
produce relationship-specific products, thereby leading to fewer hold-up problems
for the suppliers.
Theoretical studies (e.g., Grossman and Hart, 1986) suggest that joint own-
ership could mitigate the severities of hold-up problems. Common owners have
the incentive to mitigate the severities of hold-up problems because they could
actually benefit from better (relationship-specific) innovation performance of the
suppliers that could result from improved supplier-customer relationships. For
example, relationship-specific products can lower the cost of inputs for the cus-
tomers, thereby leading to higher profits and thus potentially higher values of the
customers as well as the entire portfolio. If vertical common ownership really
improve suppliers’ innovation performance by mitigating the hold-up problems
between suppliers and customers in the same portfolio, I expect to see that the
impact of vertical common ownership is less pronounced for the suppliers with
fewer hold-up problems in the first place.
The following subsections report the construction of proxies for hold-up issues,
and results of the tests for the conjectures above.
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Vertical Integration
As discussed above, if vertical common ownership really affects suppliers’ innova-
tion activities by lessening opportunities for hold-up problems between the sup-
plier and its customers, the impact of vertical common ownership on innovation
activities should be less pronounced for vertically integrated suppliers. I test this
conjecture by running the following regression:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · PV Ii,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · PV Ii,t−1)
+β3 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit,
(1)
where PV Iit is the percentage of sales from operating segments in downstream
industries out of the total sales from all its segments.13 I expect to see a negative
and statistically significant estimate for the coefficient µ on the interaction term
in equation (1) if the conjecture holds.
Table 9 reports the results for tests of this conjecture. The estimated coeffi-
cients on the interaction terms between vertical common ownership and the weight
of segments in downstream industries measured by PV I are negative and signif-
icant when the dependent variables are the innovation input and the quality of
innovation output. This finding suggests that the effects of vertical common own-
ership on the outcome variables, (1) investment in innovation and (2) quality of
innovation output, are weaker for more vertically integrated suppliers. This find-
ing is consistent with the argument that vertical common ownership improves the
innovation input and the quality of innovation output by reducing the likelihood
of hold-up problems.
Supplier Bargaining Power
If a supplier has stronger bargaining power, relative to its customers, then these
customers are less likely to act opportunistically against the supplier. I construct
the variable Size Rank Ratio (SRR) as a proxy for a supplier’s bargaining power
13I follow Martin and Otto (2017)’s procedures to identify operating segments in the down-
stream industries of a firm. More details about the method are in Appendix VI..
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Table 9. This table reports regression results for the model:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · PV Ii,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · PV Ii,t−1)
+β3 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit,
where PV I is the percentage of sales from segments in downstream industries
out of the total sales from all segments. The dependent variables are
ln(1 +R&D Intensity) in columns (1) and (2), ln(1 + #pat) in columns (3) and
(4), and ln(1 + Avg.xi) in columns (5) and (6). The supplier-level variable V CO
is an equally weighted average of supplier-customer-pair-level vertical common
ownership in columns (1), (3) and (5); and a sales-value-weighted average in
columns (2), (4) and (6). Firm and year fixed effects are employed in all
regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
ln(1 +R&D Intensity) ln(1 + #pat) ln(1 + Avg.xi)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V CO 3.057** 3.310** 27.549*** 27.048*** 32.983*** 31.691***
(2.515) (2.323) (2.958) (3.171) (3.537) (3.400)
PV I -0.003 0.002 -0.011 -0.011 -0.058 -0.063
(-0.165) (0.105) (-0.101) (-0.103) (-0.557) (-0.602)
V CO · PV I -5.780** -7.210** -9.275 -9.282 -30.959*** -29.179***
(-2.269) (-2.045) (-0.605) (-0.627) (-2.938) (-2.750)
IO HHI 0.003 0.003 0.090* 0.090* 0.104** 0.104**
(0.203) (0.218) (1.816) (1.819) (2.438) (2.444)
IO -0.003 0.000 -0.193 -0.192 0.143 0.143
(-0.175) (0.011) (-1.613) (-1.586) (1.301) (1.279)
Q -0.003 -0.003 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.047*** 0.047***
(-0.839) (-0.842) (5.199) (5.196) (7.101) (7.111)
ln(Sales) 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.397*** 0.397*** 0.207*** 0.207***
(3.795) (3.650) (8.604) (8.601) (10.781) (10.659)
Capital Intensity -0.032 -0.032 0.319** 0.321** 0.243 0.245
(-1.478) (-1.477) (2.305) (2.326) (1.562) (1.577)
Profitability -0.189** -0.189** -0.165*** -0.165*** 0.039 0.039
(-2.189) (-2.195) (-2.856) (-2.843) (0.977) (0.971)
Leverage -0.103** -0.103** -0.330*** -0.329*** -0.146*** -0.146***
(-2.155) (-2.157) (-4.951) (-4.963) (-2.793) (-2.778)
Observations 11,859 11,859 11,868 11,868 11,868 11,868
R-squared 0.824 0.824 0.821 0.821 0.775 0.775
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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where supplier i in year t has C customers. SRi(c)t denotes supplier i (customer c)’s
size rank in year t. Size rank of a firm is measured as the decile of its accumulated
sales, across the current year and the past two years, in its market as identified
by its three-digit SIC code. The weight wct applies to customer c in year t. I use
both (1) equal weights, and (2) value weights based on the sales value between
supplier and its customers.
I use accumulated sales because the market power of a firm is the consequence
of persistent market performance in multiple years. Short-term sales in a single
year may not correctly reflect the true market power of a firm. Size rank reflects
the relative market performance of a firm compared with its peers in the same
industry. It is more comparable across different industries than sales value or
market share. Sales value ignores different sizes across industries. Market share
takes industry size into consideration, but ignores the relation between the firm
and its peers in the same industry. For example, Firm A has 30% market share in
an industry with only two firms and the other firm has 70% market share, while
Firm B also has 30% market share, but in an industry with many firms and each
of these other firms has less than 5% market share. Firm A and B have the same
market share, but the market power is unlikely to be the same.
If vertical common ownership really affects suppliers’ innovation activities by
mitigating the hold-up issues between a supplier and its customers, the impact of
vertical common ownership on innovation activities should be less pronounced for
suppliers with higher SRR. I test this conjecture using the following regression:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · SRRi,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · SRRi,t−1)
+β3 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit.
(2)
If the conjecture holds, I expect to see a negative and statistically significant
estimate for the coefficient µ on the interaction term in equation (2).
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Table 10 reports the results for tests of this conjecture. The estimating sample
retains only those suppliers having all their customers with available sales data,
so the sample size for these regressions is smaller. The estimate for the coefficent
on interaction term between vertical common ownership and the size-rank ratio
is negative and significant in the model to explain innovation input. The result
suggests that the effect of vertical common ownership on investment in innovation
is weaker for a supplier with stronger bargaining power relative to its customers.
This finding is consistent with the argument that vertical common ownership
improves innovation input by minimizing the potential for hold-up problems.
Customer Input Redeployability
If customers are using an input that can be redeployed more easily to other indus-
tries, so that their suppliers’ products and related innovation are less relationship-
specific, these suppliers are less likely to be held up by their customers. Kim and
Kung (2017) develop proxies for asset redeployability according to the BEA I/O
table. Based on their measures, I construct the variable Input Redeployability





where supplier i in year t has C customers. Redeployabilityct is the firm-level
redeployability score developed by Kim and Kung (2017) for customer c in year
t. Higher Redeployabilityct implies that customer c is using a more redeployable
(i.e. less relationship-specific) input from her suppliers. Kim and Kung (2017)
also provide their dataset of redeployability scores. The factor wct denotes the
weight of customer c in year t. I use both equal weights and value weights based
on the value of sales between the supplier and its customers.
If vertical common ownership really affects suppliers’ innovation activities by
mitigating the hold-up issues between suppliers and their customers, the impact of
vertical common ownership on innovation activities should be less pronounced for
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Table 10. This table reports regression results for the model:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · SRRi,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · SRRi,t−1)
+β3 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit,
where SRRit =
∑C
c=1wctSRit/SRct. SRi(c)t denotes supplier i (customer c)’s size
rank in year t. Size rank of a firm is measured as the decile of its accumulated
sales in the current year and the past two years in its market, as identified by
three-digit SIC codes. wct denotes the weight of customer c in year t. The
dependent variables are ln(1 +R&D Intensity) in columns (1) and (2),
ln(1 + #pat) in columns (3) and (4), and ln(1 + Avg.xi) in columns (5) and (6).
V CO and SRR are equally weighted in columns (1), (3) and (5); and sales-value
weighted in columns (2), (4) and (6). Firm and year fixed effects are employed in
all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
ln(1 +R&D Intensity) ln(1 + #pat) ln(1 + Avg.xi)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V CO 6.630** 5.883*** 10.927 12.855 14.413 14.432*
(2.560) (2.815) (0.667) (0.850) (1.464) (1.746)
SRR 0.025*** 0.025*** -0.102 -0.109 -0.104*** -0.105***
(2.676) (2.635) (-1.402) (-1.520) (-3.426) (-3.115)
V CO · SRR -5.595** -5.106** 19.703 16.771 5.602 4.362
(-2.548) (-2.604) (0.930) (0.854) (0.657) (0.578)
IO HHI -0.030 -0.030 0.011 0.012 0.097* 0.098*
(-1.338) (-1.341) (0.166) (0.188) (1.660) (1.688)
IO 0.031 0.033 -0.043 -0.039 0.269* 0.275**
(1.565) (1.544) (-0.260) (-0.230) (1.956) (1.998)
Q -0.005 -0.005 0.023** 0.023** 0.036*** 0.036***
(-0.973) (-0.972) (2.252) (2.257) (4.022) (4.038)
ln(Sales) -0.059 -0.059 0.326*** 0.328*** 0.201*** 0.202***
(-1.644) (-1.646) (3.693) (3.704) (6.961) (6.929)
Capital Intensity -0.084 -0.083 0.079 0.080 -0.117 -0.115
(-1.440) (-1.432) (0.398) (0.401) (-0.790) (-0.775)
Profitability -0.038* -0.038* -0.290*** -0.290*** -0.035 -0.035
(-1.713) (-1.727) (-4.506) (-4.500) (-0.515) (-0.516)
Leverage -0.056*** -0.056*** -0.272*** -0.272*** -0.049 -0.050
(-2.770) (-2.782) (-3.067) (-3.050) (-0.669) (-0.669)
Observations 7,763 7,763 7,763 7,763 7,763 7,763
R-squared 0.866 0.866 0.829 0.829 0.799 0.799
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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suppliers with higher IR. I test this conjecture by running the following regression:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · IRi,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · IRi,t−1)
+β3 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit.
(3)
I expect to see a negative and statistically significant estimate for the coefficient
µ on the interaction term in equation (3), if the conjecture holds.
Table 11 reports the results for tests of this conjecture. Kim and Kung (2017)’s
dataset starts only in 1985, so the sample size for these regressions is smaller. The
estimates for the coefficient on the interaction term between vertical common
ownership and customer input redeployability are negative and significant when
the dependent variable is innovation input. This result suggests that the effect of
vertical common ownership on investment in innovation is weaker for the suppliers
with customers that are using more redeployable inputs from these suppliers. This
finding is consistent with the argument that vertical common ownership improves
innovation input by reducing the potential for hold-up problems with specific
consumers.
Overall, the three tests with diffrent proxies for intensity of hold-up issues con-
sistently suggest that vertical common ownership influences suppliers’ innovation
through a hold-up channel. Investment in innovation is the only robust measure of
innovation performance for the three tests. It suggests that this hold-up channel
works mainly for innovation input, and has little influence on innovation output.
Technological Spillover Channel
Another potential channel whereby vertical common ownership may impact a
supplier’s innovation activities is through technological spillover. Technological
spillover has been shown to improve corporate innovation performance (e.g., Chu
et al., 2019). Empirical evidence (e.g., Kostovetsky and Manconi, 2020) also
demonstrates that common ownership is associated with more information ex-
change concerning innovation, such as patent citations between firms. It is empir-
ically challenging to test unobservable technological spillover. In this paper, I use
a proxy for conditions that can facilitate technological spillover, in particular, the
“technology proximities” between suppliers and their customers.
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Table 11. This table reports regression results for the model:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · IRi,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · IRi,t−1) + β3 ·Xi,t−1
+ αi + αt + εit,
where IRit =
∑C
c=1wct ·Redeployabilityct. Redeployabilityct is the firm-level
redeployability score developed by Kim and Kung (2017) for customer c in year
t. The term wct denotes the weight of customer c in year t. The dependent
variables are ln(1 +R&D Intensity) in columns (1) and (2), ln(1 + #pat) in
columns (3) and (4), and ln(1 + Avg.xi) in columns (5) and (6). V CO and IR
are equally weighted in columns (1), (3) and (5); and sales-value weighted in
columns (2), (4) and (6). Firm and year fixed effects are employed in all
regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. t-statistics are
reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
ln(1 +R&D Intensity) ln(1 + #pat) ln(1 + Avg.xi)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V CO 11.946* 12.881** 26.124 32.594 13.766 8.662
(1.833) (2.165) (0.687) (0.863) (0.424) (0.282)
IR -0.086 -0.062 0.062 0.048 0.012 0.008
(-0.929) (-0.712) (0.188) (0.158) (0.038) (0.028)
V CO · IR -23.407* -27.383** -3.687 -20.231 -1.877 6.825
(-1.733) (-2.036) (-0.040) (-0.220) (-0.023) (0.088)
IO HHI -0.040 -0.040 -0.051 -0.051 0.059 0.059
(-1.279) (-1.276) (-0.991) (-0.997) (0.869) (0.865)
IO 0.077* 0.081* 0.091 0.094 0.296*** 0.303***
(1.795) (1.754) (0.709) (0.723) (2.818) (2.862)
Q -0.008 -0.008 0.016* 0.016* 0.038*** 0.038***
(-1.420) (-1.423) (1.922) (1.915) (5.287) (5.272)
ln(Sales) -0.070** -0.070** 0.248*** 0.249*** 0.155*** 0.155***
(-2.013) (-2.020) (3.618) (3.613) (8.227) (8.191)
Capital Intensity -0.009 -0.009 0.057 0.058 0.056 0.056
(-0.351) (-0.354) (0.409) (0.421) (0.357) (0.355)
Profitability -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.218*** -0.219*** 0.038 0.037
(-4.521) (-4.581) (-2.763) (-2.782) (0.685) (0.674)
Leverage -0.035* -0.035* -0.309*** -0.309*** -0.118* -0.118*
(-1.952) (-1.961) (-4.400) (-4.403) (-1.882) (-1.871)
Observations 8,914 8,914 8,920 8,920 8,920 8,920
R-squared 0.842 0.842 0.836 0.836 0.787 0.787
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
50
Jaffe (1986) suggests that technologicial spillover is related to the technological
nature of firms’ past research, and presents evidence that closer technological
positions of firms’ research programs lead to stronger spillover effects between
them. The similarity between firms’ research programs facilitates the information
spillover because it is easier for researchers in similar fields to communicate with
and learn from each other. If vertical common ownership really enhances suppliers’
innovation performance by improving technological spillovers between suppliers
and customers in the same portfolio, I expect to observe that the impact of vertical
common ownership on innovation activities is stronger for suppliers having closer
technology proximity with their customers.
Following Jaffe (1986), I construct the variable called Technology Proximity












where supplier i in year t has C customers. Sit (Cct) is a column vector, and each
element of Sit (Cct) is the ratio of the number of supplier i (customer c)’s patents
in the last three years (i.e., from year t− 2 to year t), in a given patent class, to
the total number of supplier i (customer c)’s patents in the last three years.14 The
factor wct denotes the weight of customer c in year t. I use both equal weights
and value weights based on the sales value between a supplier and its customers.
The impact of vertical common ownership on a supplier’s innovation activities
should be stronger for suppliers with higher technology proximity with its cus-
tomers if a technological spillover channel exists. I test this conjecture by running
the following regression:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · TPi,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · TPi,t−1)
+β3 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit.
(4)
I expect to see a positive and statistically significant estimate for the coefficient µ
14Before 2013, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) used the United
States Patent Classification (USPC) system to categorize patents based on the technical features.
It has 420 unique classification codes.
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on the interaction term in equation (4), if the conjecture holds.
Table 12 reports the results for tests of this conjecture. The estimates for
the coefficients on the interaction term between vertical common ownership and
technology proximity are positive and significant for both the quantity and the
quality of innovation output, but insignificant for the innovation input. These
results suggest that the effect of vertical common ownership on innovation output
is stronger for firms with greater technology proximity to their customers. This
finding is consistent with the argument that vertical common ownership improves
innovation output by improving technological spillovers between suppliers and
their customers.
Vertical Creative Destruction Channel
Vertical creative destruction describes the situation that innovations by suppliers
can devalue customers’ assets-in-place (Gofman et al., 2020). Common owners
tend to internalize all the externalities imposed on firms held in the same portfolio
(Hansen and Lott, 1996), so they might also react to the negative impact caused
by vertical creative destruction.
The vertical creative destruction effect should be the strongest if the suppliers
are capital-goods producers. In my empirical test, I identify suppliers in capital-
producing industries based on BEA I/O tables. In particular, I construct a variable
called capital-to-total-use ratio (CTUR) based on the USE table:
CTURjt = Capital Goodjt/Total Usejt,
where the use of a commodity by industry j as Capital Good is the sum of non-
residential fixed investment in equipment, intellectual property, and structures,
and residential fixed investment in the USE table. Furthermore, Total Use of
the commodity by industry j includes the intermediate use, consumption, govern-
ment use, and all other types of investment in the USE table. Then I identify the
capital-producing industries as those industries with CTUR larger than 0.5.
The impact of vertical common ownership on a supplier’s innovation activities
should be weaker for a supplier in a capital-producing industry if a vertical creative
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Table 12. This table reports regression results for the model:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · TPi,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · TPi,t−1)+








ctCct)]. Sit (Cct) is a column vector,
and each element of Sit (Cct) is the ratio of (a) the number of supplier i
(customer c)’s patents in the last three years (i.e., from year t− 2 to year t) in a
patent class to (b) the total number of supplier i (customer c)’s patents in the
last three years. The term wct denotes the weight of customer c in year t. The
dependent variables are ln(1 +R&D Intensity) in columns (1) and (2),
ln(1 + #pat) in columns (3) and (4), and ln(1 + Avg.xi) in columns (5) and (6).
V CO and TP are equally weighted in columns (1), (3) and (5); and sales-value
weighted in columns (2), (4) and (6). Firm and year fixed effects are employed in
all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level. t-statistics
are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
ln(1 +R&D Intensity) ln(1 + #pat) ln(1 + Avg.xi)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V CO 1.511** 1.027 25.917*** 24.972*** 12.070* 11.682*
(2.319) (1.575) (3.471) (3.451) (1.909) (1.919)
TP 0.021 0.018 0.312** 0.294** 0.215* 0.175
(1.007) (0.850) (2.339) (2.435) (1.699) (1.380)
V CO · TP 14.159 8.853 54.750* 50.141* 51.126* 47.971*
(1.511) (1.471) (1.919) (1.772) (1.776) (1.716)
IO HHI -0.030 -0.030 -0.006 -0.006 0.061 0.060
(-1.366) (-1.365) (-0.125) (-0.120) (1.393) (1.391)
IO 0.079* 0.083* 0.042 0.049 0.227** 0.231**
(1.763) (1.732) (0.324) (0.371) (2.071) (2.096)
Q -0.008* -0.008* 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.036*** 0.036***
(-1.730) (-1.729) (2.657) (2.630) (5.678) (5.644)
ln(Sales) -0.067** -0.066** 0.268*** 0.269*** 0.163*** 0.163***
(-2.074) (-2.073) (4.961) (4.955) (5.459) (5.445)
Capital Intensity 0.018 0.019 0.013 0.018 0.024 0.028
(0.610) (0.616) (0.102) (0.134) (0.190) (0.219)
Profitability -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.259*** -0.262*** -0.060 -0.063
(-2.703) (-2.670) (-3.831) (-3.860) (-1.100) (-1.139)
Leverage -0.075** -0.074** -0.362*** -0.361*** -0.179*** -0.179***
(-2.429) (-2.450) (-4.560) (-4.553) (-3.181) (-3.179)
Observations 11,857 11,857 11,866 11,866 11,866 11,866
R-squared 0.832 0.832 0.815 0.815 0.774 0.774
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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destruction channel really exists. I test this conjecture by running the following
regression:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · Capi,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · Capi,t−1)
+β3 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit,
(5)
where Cap is a dummy equal to one if supplier i is in an industry with CTUR
larger than 0.5. If the conjecture holds, I expect to see a negative and statistically
significant estimate for the coefficient µ on the interaction term in equation (5).
Table 13 reports the results for tests of this conjecture. The estimate for
the coefficient on the interaction term between vertical common ownership and
a dummy for a capital-goods producer is negative and significant for both the
quantity and the quality of innovation output, but does not achieve significance
for innovation input. For the innovation output variables, the magnitudes of coef-
ficients on the interaction terms are larger than those of coefficients on VCO. This
result implies that the positive effect of vertical common ownership on innovation
is offset by the negative effect caused by vertical creative destruction suppliers
that mainly producing capital goods. The positive associations between vertical
common ownership and innovation exist only for intermediate-goods producers.
This finding is consistent with the argument that vertical common ownership can
weaken innovation activities, especially for capital-goods suppliers, due to vertical
creative destruction.
Pair-level Analyses
In addition to tests of possible supplier-level mechanisms, I also test the association
between patent cross-citations and vertical common ownership at the supplier-
customer-pair level.15 In particular, I run the following regression:
ln(1 + citesc,t) = β0 + β1 · pairwise V COsc,t−1 + αs + αc + αt + εsct, (6)
15Kogan et al. (2017)’s dataset provides the patent identifiers of citing patents linked with the
patent identifiers of cited patents. Therefore, I can calculate the number of customers(suppliers)’
patents cited by their suppliers(customers)’ patents.
54
Table 13. This table reports regression results for the model:
Innovationit =β0 + β1 · V COi,t−1 + β2 · Capi,t−1 + µ · (V COi,t−1 · Capi,t−1)
+β3 ·Xi,t−1 + αi + αt + εit,
where Cap is a dummy equal to one if supplier i is in a industry with CTUR
larger than 0.5. CTURjt = Capital Goodjt/Total Usejt, where the use of a
commodity by industry j as a Capital Good is the sum of nonresidential fixed
investment in equipment, intellectual property, and structures, and residential
fixed investment. And Total Use of the commodity by industry j includes the
intermediate use, consumption, government use, and all other types of
investment. The dependent variables are ln(1 +R&D Intensity) in columns (1)
and (2), ln(1 + #pat) in columns (3) and (4), and ln(1 + Avg.xi) in columns (5)
and (6). V CO and TP are equally weighted in columns (1), (3) and (5); and
sales-value weighted in columns (2), (4) and (6). Firm and year fixed effects are
employed in all regressions. Standard errors are clustered at the industry level.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses below coefficient estimates. Significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *, **, and ***, respectively.
ln(1 +R&D Intensity) ln(1 + #pat) ln(1 + Avg.xi)
EW VW EW VW EW VW
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
V CO 2.509* 1.953* 23.196*** 22.052*** 11.210*** 11.535***
(1.870) (1.972) (2.853) (2.776) (3.659) (4.141)
V CO · Cap -2.026 -1.750* -31.575** -29.906** -38.528* -39.501*
(-1.627) (-1.689) (-2.151) (-1.983) (-1.905) (-1.968)
IO HHI -0.030 -0.029 -0.012 -0.012 0.057 0.056
(-1.280) (-1.280) (-0.246) (-0.251) (1.192) (1.186)
IO 0.081* 0.084* 0.098 0.103 0.248** 0.247**
(1.889) (1.877) (0.813) (0.862) (2.268) (2.254)
Q -0.008* -0.008* 0.015* 0.015* 0.036*** 0.036***
(-1.667) (-1.666) (1.869) (1.864) (5.888) (5.892)
ln(Sales) -0.069** -0.069** 0.275*** 0.275*** 0.168*** 0.168***
(-2.067) (-2.068) (3.920) (3.910) (10.703) (10.642)
Capital Intensity 0.025 0.025 0.034 0.037 0.043 0.045
(0.789) (0.789) (0.290) (0.317) (0.308) (0.327)
Profitability -0.078*** -0.079*** -0.276*** -0.276*** -0.051 -0.051
(-2.738) (-2.738) (-4.095) (-4.085) (-0.973) (-0.963)
Leverage -0.078** -0.079*** -0.378*** -0.377*** -0.187*** -0.186***
(-2.607) (-2.620) (-5.884) (-5.881) (-3.517) (-3.507)
Observations 11,357 11,357 11,365 11,365 11,365 11,365
R-squared 0.834 0.834 0.817 0.817 0.777 0.777
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
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where citesc includes (1) total patent cross-citations between supplier s and cus-
tomer c, (2) patent citations from supplier s to customer c, and (3) patent cita-
tions from customer c to supplier s. Both supplier and customer fixed effects are
included in the model to absorb unobserved heterogeneity across firms that may
also potentially influence patent cross-citations. The αt captures year fixed effects.
Standard errors are clustered at both the supplier and the customer industry levels.
It is a challenge to explain the implications of greater numbers of patent cross-
citations between suppliers and their customers. On the one hand, patent cross-
citations could be a proxy for innovation information exchange, which would be
relevant to the technological spillover channel. On the other hand, patent cross-
citations could be a proxy for relationship-specific innovation from the citing firm
directed towards the cited firms, which would be more relevant to the hold-up
channel. To clarify the theoretical ambiguity concerning the expected sign of the
patent cross-citation effect, I run two more regressions:
ln(1 + citesc,t) =β0 + β1 · pairwise V COsc,t−1 + β2 · pairwise SRRsc,t−1
+µ · pairwise V COsc,t−1 · pairwise SRRsc,t−1
+αs + αc + αt + εsct,
(7)
ln(1 + citesc,t) =β0 + β1 · pairwise V COsc,t−1 + β2 · pairwise TPsc,t−1
+µ · pairwise V COsc,t−1 · pairwise TPsc,t−1
+αs + αc + αt + εsct.
(8)
If patent cross-citations between suppliers and customers are relevant to relationship-
specific innovation, the impact of pair-level common ownership will be cross-
sectionally different based on the hold-up issues for the supplier-customer pair.
In particular, pair-level common ownership will have a less pronounced impact on
cross-citations for a supplier-customer pair with weaker hold-up issues in the first
place. I use the pair-level Size Rank Ratio (pairwise SRR) as the proxy for the
hold-up issues between a specific supplier-customer pair. I expect to see a negative
and statistically significant estimate for the coefficient µ in equation (7).
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Similarly, if patent cross-citations are relevant to information spillover between
suppliers and customers, the pair-level common ownership will have stronger im-
pact on cross-citations for the supplier-customer pair with closer technology prox-
imity. I use the pair-level Technology Proximity (pairwise TP ) as the proxy for
the technology proximity between a specific supplier-customer pair. I expect to
see a positive and statistically significant estimate for the coefficient µ in equation
(8).
Table 14 reports results for the three models specified above in equations (6),
(7), and (8). Panel A shows that greater pair-level vertical common ownership
increases the number of patent cross-citations between suppliers and customers,
especially the number of cross-citations from suppliers towards their customers.
Panel B tests equation (7), and shows a negative and statistically significant esti-
mate for the coefficient on the interaction between the pair-level vertical common
ownership (VCO) and the pair-level size rank ratio (SRR), when the dependent
variable is the number of patent citations from suppliers to their customers. Panel
C tests equation (8), and shows no statistical significance for the estimate of the
coefficient on the interaction term between the pair-level VCO and pair-level tech-
nology proximity. In all panels, there is no significant association between pair-
level VCO and patent cross-citations from customers to their suppliers. These
results suggest that patent cross-citations between suppliers and their customers
are more likely to be a proxy for relationship-specific innovation from suppliers
towards their customers. The findings here provide additional evidence that ver-
tical common ownership can increase a supplier’s relationship-specific innovation
by reducing the likelihood of hold-up by the supplier’s customers.
Overall, tests of the mechanisms behind the hold-up mitigation, the techno-
logical spillover, and the vertical creative destruction channels provide plausible
evidence to support the contention that vertical common ownership (1) increases
a supplier’s investment in innovation by mitigating the hold-up issues between the
supplier and its customers, (2) increases a supplier’s quantity and quality of inno-
vation output by improving technological spillovers between the supplier and its
customers, and (3) weakens a supplier’s quantity and quality of innovation output
due to vertical creative destruction.
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Table 14. This table reports regression results for three different models.
Panel A:
ln(1 + citesc,t) = β0 + β1 · pairwise V COsc,t−1 + αs + αc + αt + εsct,
Panel B:
ln(1 + citesc,t) = β0 + β1 · pairwise V COsc,t−1 + β2 · pairwise SRRsc,t−1
+ µ · (pairwise V COsc,t−1 · pairwise SRRsc,t−1)
+ αs + αc + αt + εsct,
Panel C:
ln(1 + citesc,t) = β0 + β1 · pairwise V COsc,t−1 + β2 · pairwise TPsc,t−1
+ µ · (pairwise V COsc,t−1 · pairwise TPsc,t−1)
+ αs + αc + αt + εsct,
where citesc includes (1) the total cross-citations between supplier s and
customer c, (2) the citations from supplier s to customer c, and (3) the citations
from customer c to supplier s. Supplier, customer and year fixed effects are
included in each model. Standard errors are clustered at both the supplier and
the customer industry levels. t-statistics are reported in parentheses below
coefficient estimates. Significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level is denoted by *,







pairwise V CO 7.112*** 6.777*** -0.105
(2.797) (3.181) (-0.064)
Observations 7,809 7,809 7,809
R-squared 0.720 0.662 0.662
Supplier FE Yes Yes Yes
Customer FE Yes Yes Yes









pairwise V CO 9.197** 8.694*** -0.111
(2.366) (3.374) (-0.048)






Observations 7,773 7,773 7,773
R-squared 0.721 0.662 0.663
Supplier FE Yes Yes Yes
Customer FE Yes Yes Yes







pairwise V CO 6.341*** 6.016*** -0.482
(3.033) (3.261) (-0.353)






Observations 7,809 7,809 7,809
R-squared 0.721 0.665 0.662
Supplier FE Yes Yes Yes
Customer FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
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VI. CONCLUSION
Although there is an emerging literature concerning the impact of common own-
ership on corporate financial decisions, studies that specifically address vertical
common ownership, especially its impacts on corporate investment and innova-
tion, are still rare. This paper examines the impact of vertical common ownership
on suppliers’ innovation activities. I find that suppliers’ investment in innova-
tion, and the quantity and quality of suppliers’ innovation output, all increase
when common owners hold higher fractions of the equities of suppliers and their
customers. The impacts of vertical common ownership on innovation activities
are stronger and more robust than the impacts of horizontal common ownership.
I provide plausible evidence for causality using both a difference-in-differences
approach and an instrument variable approach based on mergers of financial insti-
tutions. Moreover, I test the potential channels through which vertical common
ownership could influence supplier innovation activities. I find that such verti-
cal common ownership increases investment in innovation by mitigating potential
hold-up problems between suppliers and their customers and enhances innovation
output performance by improving technological spillovers between the suppliers
and their customers. However, my results also suggest that for suppliers producing
mainly capital goods, these positive effects of common ownership on innovation
are offset by a negative effect due to vertical creative destruction.
Overall, my evidence suggests that institutional common ownership enhances
suppliers’ innovation performance by improving relationships between suppliers
and their customers. This research establishes plausible evidence for a causal
association between common ownership and supplier innovation. Furthermore, by
exploring potential economic channels, this study has important implications for
our understanding of the impacts of common ownership along the supply chain,
thereby suggesting another possible driver for corporate innovation.
The concern about potential anti-competitive effects due to common ownership
has led the academics to recommend anti-trust scrutiny for institutional investors.
The findings of this paper suggest a positive side of common ownership. My
analyses imply that regulators may motivate institutional investors to hold firms
along the supply chain, which can be beneficial for the economy by improving
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f=1 βfit · βfct,
where there are F institutions holding both firm i and its customer c. βfi(c)t
denotes institution f ’s holding fraction of firm i (customer c) in year t. There
are C customers for firm i. The weight wct denotes customer c’s relative share
among all firm i’s customers in year t. Both equal weight and value weight
on the basis of sales value between firm i and each customer are employed
(Source: Thomson Reuters, Compustat Customer Segment).




f=1 βfit · βfjt,
where there are F institutions holding both firm i and its competitor j.
βfi(j)t denotes institution f ’s holding fraction of firm i (competitor j) in
year t. I use the FIC500 codes developed by Hoberg and Phillips (2016)
to identify competitors. There are J competitors for firm i. The weight
wjt denotes competitor j’s relative share among all the competitors in year
t. Both equal weights and value weights on the basis of market values of
competitors are employed (Source: Thomson Reuters, Hoberg and Phillips
(2016), CRSP).
 GGLV CO: vertical common ownership under various assumptions about
investors’ attention: GGLV COst =
∑C
c=1wct · GGLsct, where there are C
customers for supplier s in year t. GGLsct is the common ownership measure
for the pair of supplier s and customer c in year t. GGL can be constructed
under three different assumptions of investors’ attention: linear attention,
concave attention, and convex attention. More details about the construc-
tion of the GGL measures are provided in Appendix VI.. wct denotes the
weight of customer c. Both equal weight and sales-value weight are em-
ployed. Following Gilje et al. (2019), I also rescale the common ownership
measures by the sample mean (Source: Compustat Customer Segment, Gilje
et al. (2019)).
 R&D Intensity: R&D expenditure (XRD) divided by sales (SALE) (Source:
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Compustat).
 #pat: the number of patent applications at firm-year level (Source: Kogan
et al. (2017)).
 Avg.xi: average patent value at firm-year level (Source: Kogan et al. (2017)).





where there are F institutions holding firm i’s equity. rfit denotes institution
f ’s holding fraction of firm i among the total institutional holding in year t
(Source: Thomson Reuters).
 IO: The percentage of institutional holding among a firm’s total equity
(Source: Thomson Reuters, CRSP).
 Q: Tobin’s Q. Q = [Market value of equity (CSHOQ × PRCCQ) + total
assets (AT) - book value of equity (CEQQ) - deferred taxes (TXDBQ)] /
total assets (AT) (Source: Compustat).
 ln(Sales): Natural log of sales (SALE in $million) (Source: Compustat).
 Leverage: Total debt divided by total assets (AT), where total debt = short-
term debt (DLC) + long-term debt (DLTT) (Source: Compustat).
 Profitability: Earnings before interest, depreciation, taxes and amortiza-
tion (EBIDTA) divided by total assets (AT) (Source: Compustat).
 Capital Intensity: Net property, plant and equipment (PPENT) divided by
total assets (AT) (Source: Compustat).
 PV I: the percentage of sales from segments in downstream industries out of
the total sales from all segments. The downstream industries are identified
based on BEA I-O tables; more details about the identification method can
be referred to in Appendix VI. (Source: Compustat Segment, BEA I-O
tables).
 SRR: size rank ratio. SRRit =
∑C
c=1wctSRit/SRct. SRi(c)t denotes supplier
i (customer c)’s size rank in year t. Size rank of a firm is measured as the
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decile of its accumulated sales in current year and past two years in its market
identified by three-digit SIC code. wct denotes the weight of customer c in
year t. Both equal weight and sales-value weight are employed (Source:
Compustat Customer Segment).
 IR: customer input redeployability. IRit =
∑C
c=1wct · Redeployabilityct.
Redeployabilityct is the firm-level redeployability score developed by Kim
and Kung (2017) for customer c in year t. wct denotes the weight of customer
c in year t. Both equal weight and sales-value weight are employed (Source:
Compustat Customer Segment, Kim and Kung (2017)).








(Cct) is a column vector, and each element of Sit (Cct) is the ratio of the
number of supplier i (customer c)’s patents in the last three years (i.e., from
year t − 2 to year t) in a patent class to the total number of supplier i
(customer c)’s patents in the last three years. wct denotes the weight of
customer c in year t. Both equal weight and sales-value weight are employed
(Source: Compustat Customer Segment, Kogan et al. (2017)).
 cite: firm-pair level patent cross-citations. citesc includes (1) the total cross-
citations between supplier s and customer c, (2) the citations from supplier
s to customer c, and (3) the citations from customer c to supplier s (Source:
Kogan et al. (2017)).
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04/19/1982 01/19/1983 Pittsburgh National Corp Provident National Bank
08/02/1982 04/01/1983 Mellon Financial Girard Bank
11/18/1982 04/01/1983 Huntington National Bank Union Commerce Bank
12/21/1983 07/01/1984 Chase Manhattan Corp Lincoln First Banks Inc.
06/30/1986 02/27/1987 PNC Financial Corp Citizens Fidelty Bk & Tr
03/18/1987 01/01/1988 Fleet Financial Group Norstar Trust Company
04/27/1987 11/01/1987 Sovran Financial Corp Commerce Union Bank
07/31/1987 02/29/1988 PNC Financial Corp Central Bancorp
05/04/1988 12/26/1988 Boatmen’s Bancshares Inc Centerre Bancorp
07/15/1991 12/31/1991 Chemical Banking Corp Manufacturers Hanover Co
09/16/1991 07/23/1992 PNC Financial Corp First Natl Bank/Penn
12/30/1991 11/02/1992 Banc One Corp Affiliated Bksh/Colorado
03/18/1992 10/15/1992 NBD Bancorp Inc INB Financial Corp
09/09/1992 07/13/1993 Bank of Boston Corp Multibank Financial Corp
09/14/1992 05/21/1993 Mellon Bank Corp Boston Company Inc
11/23/1992 07/22/1993 Equitable Companies Inc Alliance Capital Mgmt
09/20/1993 05/31/1994 Marshall & Ilsley Corp Valley Trust Co/Wisc
10/18/1993 07/01/1994 First Union Corp Lieber & Co
03/06/1994 06/30/1994 First Union Corp Evergreen Asset Mgmt
11/28/1994 04/12/1995 KeyCorp Spears Benzak Salomon
02/21/1995 11/30/1995 Fleet Financial Group Shawmut Natl Corp
06/16/1995 06/16/1995 TCW Group Inc Continental Asset Mgmt
06/19/1995 01/02/1996 First Union Corp First Fidelity Bancorp
08/07/1995 02/16/1996 First Bank System Inc FirsTier Financial Inc
06/25/1996 11/01/1996 Franklin Resources Inc Heine Securities Corp
07/10/1996 10/31/1996 LGT Asset Mgmt Inc Chancellor Capital Mgmt
09/06/1996 12/12/1996 First Union Corp Keystone Invt Mgmt Co
12/30/1996 06/02/1997 Banc One Corp Liberty Bancorp Inc
01/20/1997 05/20/1997 Mellon Bank Corp Ganz Capital Mgmt Inc
03/20/1997 08/01/1997 First Bank System Inc U S Bancorp
11/05/1997 12/01/1997 Pimco Advisors LP Oppenheimer & Co LP







04/13/1998 09/30/1998 NationsBank Corp BankAmerica Corp
07/20/1998 12/31/1998 SunTrust Banks Inc Crestar Bank
02/15/1999 07/06/1999 Credit Suisse Asset M Warburg Pincus Asset M
03/14/1999 10/01/1999 Fleet Boston Corp BankBoston Corp
06/20/2000 10/02/2000 AXA Financial Sanford C Berstein
09/13/2000 12/31/2000 JP Morgan & Co Chase Manhattan
10/25/2000 04/10/2001 Franklin Resources Fiduciary Trust Intl
10/18/2000 02/14/2001 Allianz Dresdner Nicholas-Applegate
08/26/2003 08/26/2003 Wells Fargo & Co Benson Associate
10/27/2003 04/01/2004 Bank of America Fleet Boston
05/26/2004 01/03/2005 Wells Fargo & Co Strong Capital Mgmt
08/26/2004 01/31/2005 BlackRock StateStreet Res & Mgmt
05/19/2005 08/04/2005 Transamerica Invt Mgmt WestCap Investors
10/31/2006 12/04/2006 Morgan Stanley FrontPoint
12/03/2006 07/02/2007 Bank of NY Trust Mellon Bank
07/07/2008 11/07/2008 RiverSource Invt J.&W. Seligman
09/16/2008 09/22/2008 Barclays Bank Lehman Brothers Inc
09/15/2008 01/01/2009 Bank of America Merrill Lynch
06/12/2009 12/01/2009 BlackRock Inc Barclays Bank Plc
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C. OPERATING SEGMENTS IN DOWNSTREAM INDUSTRIES
An operating segment is a profitable unit of a firm that (1) reports its own financial
information, such as revenues and expenses, and (2) is regularly supervised by the
firm’s executives. I identify operating segments in the downstream industries for
a firm following the procedures of Martin and Otto (2017).
First, following Acemoglu et al. (2016), I identify industry-level supplier-
customer relationships based on the gross flows of commodities between indus-
tries reported in the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis input-output (BEA I/O)
tables. The tables include “MAKE” table that links the producers’ industries
with the commodities’ industries, and “USE” table that links the consumers’ in-
dustries with the commodities’ industries. By matching the two tables on the
basis of commodities’ industries, I can identify the upsteam industries and their
related downstream industries. BEA I/O tables are provided every five years. For
my data sample, I refer to the BEA I/O tables from 1982 to 2007. The BEA
I/O tables report IO code as industry identification for producers, commodities,
and consumers. The linking tables between IO code and SIC or NAICS are also
provided.16
Next, the Compustat Segment database reports SIC codes for each firm and
its primary operating segments. An operating segment is identified as being in
the downstream industry of its firm if the SIC codes of the firm and the operating
segment show that they are in the upstream industry and related downstream
industry according to BEA I/O tables.
16According to US Census Bureau, NAICS replaced SIC in 1997. Thus, BEA I/O tables
start to provide IO-linking-NAICS table instead of IO-linking-SIC table from 1997. A detailed
conversion between SIC and NAICS is available from US Census Bureau.
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D. CONSTRUCTION OF THE GGL MEASURES





αi,A · g(βi,A) · αi,B,
where αi,A(B) denotes institution i’s holding fraction of firm A(B), βi,A denotes
the weight of firm A in institution i’s portfolio. g(·) is a function mapping from
βi,A to institution i’s attention towards firm A. The form of g(·) varies according
to three assumptions about an asset manager’s attention:
(1) Linear attention: g(βi,A) = βi,A.
An investor’s attention is proportional to the weight of a specific firm in her
portfolio.
(2) Convex attention: g(βi,A) = β
2
i,A.
An investor devotes more attention to the firm with higher weight in her
portfolio.
(3) Concave attention:g(βi,A) = β
0.5
i,A.
An investor devotes less attention to the firm with higher weight in her
portfolio.





where supplier i has J customers. The term wjt denotes the weight of customer j
among all customers in year t. I use both (1) equal weights and (2) value weights
on the basis of sales from the supplier to each of its customers. Following Gilje
et al. (2019), I also rescale each measure by its sample mean.
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